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The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of
Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and
to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which
have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizens. 1
I. INTRODUCTION

In law, as in life, getting it right is far more important than
getting it done. While getting it done has its virtues, minimizing
error is the ideal. Implicit in minimizing error is the recognition
that error will remain in any system. How we manage ever-present
error is as important as what we do to minimize it. Nowhere is that
management more important than in the employment discrimination
context.
In responding to employment discrimination, the Supreme Court
has attempted to minimize systemic error in Title VII disparate
treatment cases through the three-step process developed in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 2 The McDonnell Douglas test
requires a plaintiff-employee to present a prima facie case that he or
she was a victim of intentional discrimination. 3 The employer is
then required to show that a legitimate, non-discriminatory re'ason
existed for the adverse job action. 4 Finally, the employee is allowed
to demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext for intentional
discrimination. 5 The McDonnell Douglas test has been redefined
and refined in the years since its inception to meet the twin goals of
reducing and allocating error in the disparate treatment context. 6
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks 7 is the Court's most recent attempt
to follow the same path.
Hicks can be paraphrased simply: if, afte.r trial in a disparate
treatment case, the fact finder is not persuaded by a preponderance
of the evidence that intentional discrimination occurred, the
1

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (citations omitted).
411 U.S. 792.
3
See id. at 802.
4
See id.
5
See id. at 804.
6
See discussion infra Part II. That the Court devised a special test to address disparate
treatment discrimination suggests that the general civil litigation system was inadequate to
handle the issue of intentional discrimination. See discussion infra Part III.
7
509 U.S. 502 (1993).
2
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employee loses. 8 The specific issue in Hicks was whether a prima
facie case coupled with proof that the employer's proffered reasons
for the subject job action were false ("proof of falsity") requires a
verdict for the employee. 9 The Court determined that proof of falsity
was not proof that discrimination more likely than not caused the job
action. 1° Consequently, the absence of credible reasons explaining
the job action does not eliminate the possibility or likelihood that
some unproffered, legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is the true
reason for the firing. 11
Practically, an employee may lose his or her Title VII case unless
he or she disproves all possible reasons for the job action other than
discrimination. When one considers that plaintiffs who prove all
they previously were expected to prove under the McDonnell Douglas
test may lose, the Hicks decision undermines the earlier standard. 12
Whether the Hicks Court's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas
test increases the fairness and accuracy of the Title VII system is the
main concern of this Article.
The Court's recent foray into the disparate treatment realm tracks
the debate now extant in society: when a minority or other member
of an outgroup is harmed and no credible reason is presented as the
cause, is such harm more likely a result of discrimination rather
than some unknown non-discriminatory reason? The Hicks Court's
answer to that question is the new paradigm in employment
discrimination. In the process, the practical question has shifted
from whether the employee was more likely than not a victim of
intentional discrimination, to whether the fact finder is sure that
intentional discrimination occurred. 13 Basing a decision on the
second question explicitly changes the type and/or amount of
8

See id. at 506-11.
See id. Title VII refers to many adverse job actions that are visited upon employees. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). However, as Hicks was based on the plaintiffs discharge, this
article often will refer to an employee's firing or discharge rather than an adverse job action.
10
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517-24 (holding that proof that the proffered reason is not true does
not compel a verdict for the employee).
11
Cf. Bina v. Providence College, 39 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for denial of tenure in evidence not offered by the defendant), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1406 (1995).
12
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 525-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
13
The Hicks majority made clear that actually convincing the fact finder that discrimination
occurred is the key: "We have no authority to impose liability upon an employer for alleged
discriminatory employment practices unless an appropriate factfinder determines, according
to proper procedures, that the employer has unlawfully discriminated." Id. at 514. The
majority added, "It is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder
must believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination." Id. at 519.
9
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evidence necessary for an employee to prevail and heightens the
functional standard of proof necessary to find liability in employment
discrimination cases. 14 The resulting standard of proof will make
recovery more difficult for Title VII plaintiffs. 15
The remainder of this Article will explore whether the Court is
getting it right or merely getting it done in the disparate treatment
context. Part II of this Article will present the contradictory forces
underlying getting it done and getting it right in the civil justice
system in general, and in employment discrimination litigation in
particular. Part III will explore the orthodoxy of disparate treatment
law as it stands after Hicks. Part IV will examine the effect of
abandoning the paradigm that proof of falsity is proof of intentional
discrimination. Part V will offer suggestions on what the Court can
do to make sure that it gets it right.
II.

SEARCHING FOR TRUTH AND DEALING WITH ERROR

Our justice system is a proxy for the truth, with a trial being a
search for the truth. A trial is an attempt to determine the truth by
examining the evidence left by the truth. 16 For this reason, among
others, verdicts are not always accurate. 17 In civil litigation, some

14
See Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin is Now Exculpation, 28
CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 942 (1995) (stating that the Supreme Court may be "manipulat[ing]
the evidentiary and procedural standards to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail
against employers").
15
Possibly more important is why the standard of proof has changed. In all likelihood, the
alteration has far more to do with the Supreme Court's personnel than the continuation of
precedent. For example, Professor Essary opines that the Hicks decision was based on
(1) the belief that bias in the workplace is no longer prevalent; (2) the belief that
frivolous discrimination claims under the pre-Hicks model were commonplace; or (3)
the belief that despite the merits or non-merits of claims, the federal court system
is overloaded with discrimination claims and that procedural vehicles should be used
to alleviate this problem.
Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High Court Muddies
the Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Discrimination Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 385, 388
(1994). See also Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Small Numbers, Big Problems, Black Men, and
the Supreme Court: A Reform Program for Title VII After Hicks, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 241, 245-50
(1994) (suggesting that the McDonnell Douglas test was reformulated due, in part, to the
perception that employers were incorrectly being found liable and that such fear was
frightening employers into hiring minorities in order to avoid suits).
16
For example, if an employee is fired for incompetence, we would expect to find evidence
of the incompetence and that such incompetence had an impact on the decision at issue. The
evidence presented is the residue of the truth.
17
In the criminal arena, verdicts often are not the system's best reckoning of the truth. A
not guilty verdict is not necessarily the system's best guess at guilt. Indeed, if juries believed
that every defendant who was found not guilty was actually innocent, we would have to

6
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defendants who should be found liable are not ("false negatives"),
and some defendants who should not be found liable are ("false
positives"). 18 This is endemic to the justice system and should come
as no surprise even to those not well versed in the law. Of course,
false positives and false negatives exist in the criminal justice system
as well. Tragically, innocent defendants are convicted and guilty
defendants are freed. No society has yet developed a system that
guarantees truth and justice. A more reasonable and attainable goal
is to create a system of justice that renders verdicts reflecting the
truth as often as possible and fairly distributes the remaining error.
The burden of proof system allocates error in the justice system in
ways palatable to society. In civil trials, where money usually is
involved, the system requires a preponderance of the evidence for a
plaintiff to prevail. 19 This standard of proof is sufficient because
the fact finder need only believe that the asserted conduct probably
occurred in order to require a mere wealth transfer. 20 The risk of
error is divided equally between plaintiff and defendant because the
risk of a false positive is equal to that of a false negative. 21 The
criminal justice system requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as
liberty is at stake and the accused should not go to jail unless the
fact finder is certain that the accused committed the crime charged.

presume that police arrest, and prosecutors accuse, many people whom they have little reason
to believe are guilty.
18
See Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1369, 1406 (1991); Thomas A. Cunniff, Note, The Price of Equal Opportunity: The
Efficiency of Title VII After Hicks, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 507, 522 (1995).
19
The clear and convincing standard is used when a fact finder must be more certain of the
nature of relevant facts. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983)
("[W)e have required proof by clear and convincing evidence where particularly important
individual interests or rights are at stake."); cf. Robert Brookins, Mixed-Motives, Title VII, and
Removing Sexism from Employment: The Reality and the Rhetoric, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1, 128-31
(1995) (explaining that the social issue at stake determines the level of proofrequired).
20
See Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, as Perceived by Randy Barnett, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1508, 1524 (1994) (stating that the presumption of innocence has been "explained by Max
Radin as 'little more than an assertion' that 'much stronger evidence is needed to find a man
guilty of a crime than to find that he owes a sum of money'") (quoting MAx RADIN, HANDBOOK
OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY§ 137, at 229 (1936)).
21
See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 390 ("A preponderance-of-the-evidence standard
allows both parties to 'share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.'") (quoting Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)); see also Ronald J. Allen, Burdens ofProof, Uncertainty, and
Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'V 627, 634 (1994) ("We thus
strive to treat [civil litigants] equally by making errors against them in a roughly symmetrical
fashion, which under certain constraints the preponderance standard does."); Dale A. Nance,
Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 64 7, 659 (1994) (stating that the
preponderance of the evidence standard in civil cases is a reflection of"the law's approximately
equal concern to avoid mistaken judgment for either side").
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Although both false positives and false negatives exist in the
criminal justice arena, false positives should occur with much less
frequency in the criminal justice system than in the civil justice
system. In the criminal context, the risk of error is heavily weighted
against the State. Society simply is more willing to tolerate false
negatives than false positives in the criminal justice system. 22 The
differing levels of proof suggest that error in each part of the justice
system is distributed between parties in a manner society deems
fit.23

The twin goals of eliminating error and properly allocating error
can conflict in the civil justice system. If a systemic change causes
a decrease in the total number of errors made under the system, a
conflict may not exist. However, if eliminating error results in a
system in which false positives or false negatives seriously
predominate, the resulting system may embrace an apparently
higher or lower burden of proof due to the redistribution of systemic
error. Thus, if a court focuses on decreasing the number of false
positives while ignoring false negatives, either because of a belief
that false negatives do not exist or do not matter, that court has
created a system with a relatively higher standard of proof. Any
systemic redistribution of error will yield a system with a higher or
lower standard of proof. Whether the new system's standard of proof
approximates a preponderance of the evidence or reasonable doubt
standard depends on the prior system's allocation of error.
Under Title VII, both false positives and false negatives will occur.
This is expected, since Title VII litigation is controlled by the same

22
See Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt", 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 980-81 (1993).
Chief Judge Newman states:
The inevitability of both types of mistakes usually leads us to say that it is better to
acquit some number of guilty persons than to convict one innocent person. What we
would not readily agree on is the appropriate ratio of guilty persons acquitted to
innocent persons convicted. The cases have frequently mentioned a ratio of ten to
one, though ratios of twenty to one and even ninety-nine to one have been mentioned
in earlier literature.
Id. at 980-81 (footnotes omitted); see also Lawrence B. Solum, You Proue It! Why Should I?, 17
HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 691, 701 (1994) ("[B]etter that ten guilty persons go free than one
innocent person be convicted.").
23
See Allen, supra note 21, at 634 (arguing that the burden of proof and persuasion changes
when society wants errors to be skewed in one party's favor); see also Adrian A.S. Zuckerman,
Law, Fact or Justice, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487, 498-99 (1986) ("The requirement of proof on the
balance of probabilities may ... be taken to be an expression of the law's neutrality between
civil litigants and not an expression of the policy of maximizing correct conclusions.").
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civil justice system that directs other litigation. 24 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court's goal in recent Title VII disparate treatment
jurisprudence seems to be to rid the system of error solely by
eliminating false positives. 25 The Court has attempted to reach this
goal by abandoning and restructuring principles of proof that
underlie the McDonnell Douglas test. 26 An elimination of error in
the Title VII system is difficult to attack, if false negatives are
unlikely to increase. Whether the Court's new formulation will
decrease false positives while increasing false negatives remains to
be seen. If the new formulation has that effect, the Court has simply
reallocated the error in Title VII litigation, with a resulting relative
increase in the employee's burden of proof. 27 To determine whether
the Court has decreased error without effecting a fundamental
change in the allocation of error, we must undertake a reexamination of the McDonnell Douglas test, as altered by succeeding
case law.
Ill.

THE ORTHODOXY OF DISPARATE TREATMENT

A.

The McDonnell Douglas Test

The three-step process announced in McDonnell Douglas is
simple. 28 The plaintiff-employee must establish a prima facie case
of discrimination. 29 Once the prima facie case is established, a

24

See Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a
Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (1981) ("Discrimination cases
generally are considered to be civil actions in which the plaintiff must establish his claim for
relief by the preponderance of the evidence standard.").
25
See Culp, supra note 15, at 246 (explaining that eliminating false positives has been at
the cost of ignoring false negatives).
26
See id. (stating that Hicks is a manifestation of the Supreme Court's historical desire to
decrease the number of false positives, what Culp terms Type II errors).
27
According to Culp, minimization of the costs of false positives and false negatives is the
economically preferred solution. See id. at 260-61. Whether such a formulation maximizes
justice has yet to be seen.
28
The process may be too simple. One commentator has suggested that the prima facie case
is too weak to create an inference of discrimination and that a defendant's mere burden to
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is too light to rebut the inference, or
consequently, to move the inquiry forward. See George Rutherglen, Reconsidering Burdens of
Proof: Ideology, Evidence, and Intent in Individual Claims of Employment Discrimination, 1
VA. J. Soc. POLY & L. 43, 54-56 (1993).
29
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981); McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The components of the prima facie case will change depending on
the facts underlying the cause of action. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 n.6; McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. In a failure to rehire case, the prima facie case may be proven:
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mandatory, rebuttable presumption exists that intentional
discrimination occurred. 30 The burden of production then shifts to
the defendant-employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse job action. 31 The employee prevails unless
the employer presents evidence rebutting the prima facie case. 32 If
the employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the job action, the employee has the opportunity to demonstrate that
the reason given is pretextual. 33 After that inquiry, the fact finder
issues a verdict.
The McDonnell Douglas test was a reaction to the normal two-step
litigation process in disparate treatment cases. 34 Prior to McDonnell Douglas, Title VII disparate treatment litigation was treated like
most other civil litigation. 35 Simply put, a plaintiff presented his
or her case, a defendant presented his or her case, and the judge
directed a verdict or the fact finder issued the verdict. 36 The
perceived failure of this traditional process in the disparate treatment context drove its reconfiguration. This reconfiguration hinged

by showing (i) that [the plaintift] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In a dismissal case, plaintiff can establish a prima facie
case "by proving (1) that he is black, (2) that he was qualified for the [subject] position ... ,
(3) that he was demoted from that position and ultimately discharged, and (4) that the position
remained open and was ultimately filled by a white man." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 506 (1993).
The Hicks Court's indication that the race of an employee's replacement may have mattered
should not be taken as a suggestion that replacement by a Caucasian is a prerequisite to a
prima facie case. The Court merely indicated that the totality of proof indicated that the
"minimal requirements of ... a prima facie case" were satisfied. Id. See also Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas test is not to
be employed "rigid[ly], mechani[cally], or ritualistic[ally]"). Though replacement by a
Caucasian person does not seem to be required in order to prove a prima facie case, the fact
that the Hicks Court seems to welcome it as a possible component of a prima facie case may
provide insights regarding other sections of the Hicks opinion.
30
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
3
~ See id.; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
32
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
33
See id. at 255-56; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
34
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 798 (stating that certiorari was granted "[i]n order
to clarify the standards governing the disposition of an action challenging employment
discrimination").
35
See Essary, supra note 15, at 396-97.
36
When McDonnell Douglas was decided, all Title VII trials were bench trials. The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 provided plaintiffs the right to jury trials. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, § 1977A(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994)).

10
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on at least two factors: plaintiffs often did not have access to all the
information that could help prove discrimination, and seemingly
legitimate reasons given by employers for adverse job actions were
often masks for discrimination. 37 The mandatory presumption and
the pretext inquiry of the McDonnell Douglas test helped to
neutralize those problems.
The mandatory presumption allows exploration of an employer's
reasons for the adverse job action. Without the presumption, an
employer might decline to present a case, believing that no fact
finder would be willing to find intentional discrimination based solely
on a prima facie case. Such an occurrence might allow an employer
to escape liability based on an employee's insufficient access to facts
rather than on a finding that the employer probably did not
discriminate. Similarly, the pretext stage allows an employee to
show that discrimination may lurk behind the reasons given for the
adverse job action. These aspects of the McDonnell Douglas test
allow the fact finder to determine what likely caused an employee's
firing more accurately than the traditional two-step method. Thus,
the test is a tool to eliminate error from Title VII litigation, and
ultimately is a good way to get to the truth. 38
Nonetheless, the McDonnell Douglas test has outlived its usefulness if it no longer provides greater accuracy than the traditional
structure it replaced. Whether the McDonnell Douglas test is
perceived by the courts to be more accurate than the traditional
structure is the key to its livelihood. Relevant perceptions may have

37

The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir.
1972), affd, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), contained the seeds for the Supreme Court's McDonnell
Douglas test:
[A] black job applicant must usually rest his case of discrimination upon proof that he
possessed the requisite qualifications to fill the position which was denied him ....
When a black man demonstrates that he possesses the qualifications to fill a job
opening and that he was denied the job which continues to remain open, we think he
presents a prima facie case of racial discrimination. However, an applicant's past participation in unlawful conduct directed at his prospective employer might indicate the
applicant's lack of a responsible attitude toward performing work for that employer.
. . . Green should be given the opportunity to show that these reasons offered by the
Company [for its failure to rehire] were pretextual, or otherwise show the presence of
racially discriminatory hiring practices by McDonnell which affected its decision.
Id. at 352-53 (footnote omitted).
38
See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the McDonnell
Douglas test "is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common
experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination"); cf. Brookins, supra note 14,
at 982 n.258 (stating that the McDonnell Douglas test's "pretextual channel resembles the res
ipsa loquitur model in the Jaw of torts").
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changed with the times, given the personnel changes of the federal
courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular. Of course,
Title VII litigation can be conducted using the traditional structure,
if necessary. Indeed, those employees with direct ·evidence of
discrimination have always presented their cases according to the
traditional structure. 39 The McDonnell Douglas test simply established a less onerous and more accurate method for employees to
demonstrate their right to relief. Of course, if the Hicks Court's
interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas test makes it more onerous
than the traditional two-step proof structure, the Hicks gloss should
be discarded. The McDonnell Douglas test surely was not designed
to make recovery more difficult for plaintiff-employees. Next, this
Article will examine the McDonnell Douglas test in detail, in part to
determine what form of the test the courts should use.
B.

The Prima Facie Case, Mandatory Presumption of
Discrimination, and Inference of Discrimination

1. Purpose of the Prima Facie Case
Proof of a generic prima facie case allows or forces a fact finder to
find a relationship between the prima facie case and a presumed
fact. The character of the relationship rests on the strength of the
inference or presumption that joins the prima facie case to the
presumed fact. 40 A presumption's effect can range from mandating
a finding that the presumed fact is true to merely allowing a fact
finder to infer that the presumed fact is true. 41 The stronger the
relationship between the proven and presumed fact, the stronger the
inference or presumption. 42
The Title VII prima facie case fits into this structure by providing
the impetus to suspect that intentional discrimination (the presumed
fact) occurred. 43 The mandatory, rebuttable presumption that

89
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (stating that the
McDonnell Douglas test is "inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination").
40
See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE
803 (2d ed. 1982).
41
·
See id.
42
See id.
43
See Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577 ("A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on impermissible factors.")

12
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follows the prima facie case cements the relationship between the
prima facie case (predicate facts) and intentional discrimination. The
Supreme Court recognized that the Title VII prima facie case and
intentional discrimination did not have to be linked so strongly. In
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,44 the Court
explicitly recognized two meanings of the term "prima facie case."
The Court stated that the Title VII prima facie case "establish[es] ... a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption," and
noted that the term "prima facie case" could also denote that
sufficient evidence had been presented to allow a fact finder to infer
the presumed fact. 45 This distinction, as well as its import, was
echoed in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Hicks. 46 The
practical effect of linking the Title VII prima facie case and intentional discrimination with a mandatory presumption is that belief of
the prima facie case coupled with no evidence rebutting the
presumption yields a verdict for a plaintiff-employee as a matter of
law. 47
That some relationship exists between the Title VII prima facie
case and intentional discrimination seems obvious. 48 However, the
Court's opinions do not indicate why it chose such a strong link
between the prima facie case and intentional discrimination; i.e., the
mandatory presumption of discrimination rather than a weaker

44

450 U.S. 248 (1981).
Id. at 254 n.7.
46
See 509 U.S. at 507-08 (1993) (Scalia, J., majority); id. at 527 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Specifically, the dissent recognized that
it is important to note that in this context a prima facie case is indeed a proven case.
Although, in other contexts, a prima facie case only requires production of enough
evidence to raise an issue for the trier of fact, here it means that the plaintiff has
actually established the elements of the prima facie case to the satisfaction of the
factfinder by a preponderance of the evidence.
Id.
47
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 ("If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence
[underlying the prima facie case], and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.");
see also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 ("To establish a 'presumption' is to say that a finding of the
predicate fact (here, the prima facie case) produces 'a required conclusion in the absence of
explanation' (here, the finding of unlawful discrimination.")) (citing 1 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE§ 67, at 536 (1977)).
46
See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("A prima facie case under
McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts,
if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors.").
45
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counterpart, such as a mere permissible inference of
discrimination. 49 The answer could derive from the inferential
strength of the facts underlying the prima facie case, the intended
effect of the presumption on the justice system, or a combination of
the two. 50
The inferential strength of the facts underlying the Title VII prima
facie case does not adequately explain the use of the mandatory
presumption. 51 A prima facie case may consist solely of proof that
a competent, qualified minority plaintiff has been passed over for a
job and that people with plaintiff's qualifications were continually
sought for the unfilled position. 52 The facts supporting a prima
facie case do have sufficient power to create a permissible inference
of discrimination, but probably do not have sufficient predictive
power to prove that intentional discrimination definitely occurred

49

A few likely reasons exist to explain the strength of the presumption, although the Court
does not explain them. See Essary, supra note 15, at 398-99 (noting that the Court's
explanations have included assuring efficient and trustworthy labor, eliminating the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for an employee's rejection, and focusing the factual issue
to allow an employee to show pretext).
50
Regardless of the reason, the fact that the Supreme Court chose to bind the prima facie
case tightly with the fact of intentional discrimination should determine the lingering effect
the prima facie case should have on the remainder of the McDonnell Douglas test. For
instance, because the plaintiff prevails whenever the presumption stands unrebutted, an
employer's claim that it does not have information regarding the reason an employee was fired
should not be sufficient to allow the employer to avoid Title VII liability, if the claim is made
after the prima facie case is presented. This suggests that the claim that an employer lacks
knowledge regarding the actual reasons for the job action should never release the employer
from Title VII liability, regardless of when the claim is made. Such a suggestion complements
the notion that one reason the prima facie case exists is to help employees who do not have
access to information which the employer presumably has. See Belton, supra note 24, at 1284
("Courts have long acknowledged the policy that the burden of proof should be placed upon the
party who presumably has the peculiar means of access to the evidence necessary to prove a
disputed fact."); Kimberlye K. Fayssoux, Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change, 73 VA. L. REV. 601, 627 (1987) ("The scheme of
shifting burdens and presumptions in employment discrimination cases is intended to put the
burden on the party best able to produce pertinent evidence."); cf. Allen, supra note 21, at 631
(explaining that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur arose in order "to restore the appropriate
balance between parties when one party has access to information that the other lacks").
51
See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A
Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) (noting that the prima
facie "inference is rather weak. The prima facie case, far from establishing with any conviction
that intentional discrimination was likely, really only eliminates two or three common
nondiscriminatory explanations for the plaintiff's rejection."); cf. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54
("The prima facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.").
52
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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under any standard of proof. 53 Only when no credible reason
explaining a job action is found does the link between the Title VII
prima facie case and intentional discrimination fully strengthen.
The lack of a credible reason for a job action, rather than the
existence of the job action and the minority status of the employee,
should drive the mandatory presumption. 54 Because the mandatory
presumption far outstrips the inferential force of the prima facie
facts alone, it seems clear that the vitality of the post-prima facie
presumption of discrimination rests on the effect that the
presumption is to have on the trial process. 55
The mandatory presumption has at least two related effects: it
forces employers to present reasons for their actions, and it provides
guidance to judges regarding how to adjudicate particular cases. The
presumption also forces an employer to attack the prima facie case
and the presumption of discrimination, or lose. Merely attacking the
prima facie case is risky because an unsuccessful attack would leave
an unrebutted presumption of discrimination and a verdict in the
employee's favor. Only when an employer attacks the presumed fact
of discrimination and suggests that some non-discriminatory reason
existed for the subject job action can a fact finder determine that a
prima facie case exists, but that the employer is not liable under
Title VII. Thus, the mandatory nature of the presumption provides
a strong incentive for an employer to present a defense centered on
the reasons for the adverse job action. This incentive helps increase
the accuracy of the trial process by allowing the fact finder to
evaluate the employee's claims based on all available evidence from
both parties.
The mandatory nature of the presumption also directs judges to
adjudicate cases in a particular fashion when a dearth of evidence
exists because the employer has refused to provide it. An employer's

03

See Brookins, supra note 19, at 93 ("Presumptions reflect judicial assessments of the
probativeness of certain evidence and add an artificial force of logic or persuasiveness to weak
evidence, thereby serving as a kind of judicial 'tailwind.'") (footnote omitted).
54
It would seem sensible to impose the mandatory presumption only after the employer has
presented its evidence, as the presumption is driven by the employer's lack of evidence. See
discussion infra Part V (arguing for the imposition of a mandatory presumption which would
require a finding of intentional discrimination if the employee demonstrates that the.
employer's proffered reasons are false).
56
Arguably, an employer lacks a credible reason for the job action until. it presents one.
While this is linguistically accurate, a lack of evidence is hardly evident before both parties
have had a chance to present evidence. Once an employer declines to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for the job action, then a prima facie case alone supports the mandatory
presumption of discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
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refusal to rebut a prima facie case yields a directed verdict or
summary judgment for the employee. 56 Were the presumption
merely permissible, the goal of forcing an employer to explain the job
action would be jeopardized because an employer might decline to
present a rebuttal case under the assumption that a judge will not
grant a verdict for the employee based solely on a prima facie
case. 57 A judge's decision not to make the inference could be based
on a general lack of sympathy for Title VII plaintiffs or cases, rather
than a lack of evidence, and thus would undermine the efficacy of the
prima facie case and Title VII itself. 58 In situations where judges
decline to make the inference, employees might lose their cases
without a reasonable inquiry regarding the reason they were fired.
Thus, it is likely that part of the presumption's intended effect was
to force judges who would not have made the inference of
discrimination after the prima facie case to do so in bench trials, and
to force them to grant directed verdicts and summary judgment in
favor of employees when employers did not answer the prima facie
case. 59

56

See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
With a permissible inference, judges should not grant summary judgment in favor of
employers. If the fact finder could infer that intentional discrimination occurred, summary
judgment in favor of an employer would be inappropriate, as no defendant could be entitled
to judgment as a matter oflaw. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
("[S]ummary judgment will not lie ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party."); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) ( stating that summary judgment is proper only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"). This argument may seem
academic since, at the time the Court pronounced McDonnell Douglas, surviving summary
judgment simply meant a trial with a judge as fact finder. See supra note 36. Nonetheless,
an employee gains some advantage in being assured of a hearing during which the employer
might not present a case, and the fact finder can judge the employer's credibility.
58
In light of the district court's decision in Hicks to disregard the inference of discrimination
after a showing of pretext, concerns regarding what fact finders would do if the presumption
stemming from the Title VII prima facie case were merely permissible should be well taken.
See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (denying inference
of discrimination), rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
59
See Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning The Basic
Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997 (1994) Professor Calloway states:
A presumption is a judicially or legislatively created mechanism for predetermining
the sufficiency of evidence to support a factual or legal conclusion. It saves time and
legal resources, but it also can serve the purpose of forcing a correct decision that
courts and juries are likely not to reach because of their personal prejudices and
biases. Inferring discrimination is just such a situation and warrants exactly that
treatment.
Id. at 1037. See also Allen, supra note 21, at 636 (arguing that presumptions developed in part
to offset a fact finder's "high probability of ... misevaluating certain evidence").
57
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The result of the McDonnell Douglas test has not been a cavalcade
of summary judgments for employees. The role and result of the
prima facie case and presumption is not to provide a decisional rule,
but rather to strongly encourage employers to present their reasons
for the subject job action. 60 Once the prima facie case and related
presumption have forced an employer to offer reasons for its actions,
the prima facie case and presumption are easy to ignore. Indeed, the
prima facie structure "drops from the case" and becomes irrelevant
by the time the case is completed. 61 However, the facts underlying
the prima facie case should not be forgotten as the Title VII case
progresses beyond the prima facie stage. The important inquiry is
what the evidence underlying the prima facie case reveals about the
likelihood of employment discrimination. The evidence underlying
the prima facie case should indicate that a qualified minority was
refused a job and the employer continued to look for a suitable
candidate. Unless the employer can explain why this occurred, the
existence of these facts suggests possible discrimination.
2. Effects of the Prima Facie Case
The import of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case does not
rest solely on the mandatory presumption attached to it. The
mandatory presumption that follows a Title VII prima facie case is
not indispensable to Title VII enforcement. 62 That Title VII cases
can be tried under the traditional civil litigation model does not
suggest the elimination of the presumption or the McDonnell
Douglas test. Both are sensible adjuncts to the civil ju_stice system
and allow Title VII to be vigorously enforced. A prima facie cas'e is

60
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 521 (1993) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas
presumption is a procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof and production.").
61
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10; see also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510 (stating that "the
McDonnell Douglas framework ... is no longer relevant" once the employer has carried its
burden of production). Indeed, in United States Postal Service Board of Governors u. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711 (1983), the Supreme Court indicated that once all evidence is received, it does not
matter whether a prima facie case was ever made; all that matters is whether the case for
discrimination has been made. See id. at 715. This pronouncement has at least two
implications. First, a plaintiff is not forced into the McDonnell Douglas three-part process to
win its discrimination case. Second, the inference of discrimination may flow from the totality
of evidence, rather than solely from any particular set of facts constituting a prima facie case.
62
Title VII cases can be tried under the traditional litigation model. See Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
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any set of facts from which an ultimate fact can be inferred. 63
Although the facts underlying a Title VII prima facie case alone may
not be sufficient to indicate that intentional discrimination definitely
occurred, they are sufficient to indicate that intentional
discrimination may have occurred. 64 The facts underlying the
prima facie case are important not because they form a prima facie
case from which the mandatory presumptive inference flows under
the McDonnell Douglas test, but because they form a prima facie
case from which a permissible factual inference can always flow. 65
The Supreme Court has never defined the set of facts necessary to
create a prima facie case. The Court has only stated that particular
sets of facts are sufficient to be deemed a prima facie case. Consequently, the facts of the prima facie case presented in McDonnell
Douglas and other cases are not necessary to form a prima facie case;
they are merely examples of what is sufficient to form one. The fact
that the plaintiff-employee was qualified for the job left unfilled by
the employer was only one element of the prima facie case in
McDonnell Douglas. 66 As long as a set of facts that supports an
inference of discrimination is presented, proof of qualification should
not be required to prove a prima facie case. For example, if a prima
facie case suggests that a minority employee is not qualified for a
promotion, but the majority race employee who received the
promotion was even less qualified, intentional discrimination could
be inferred from the totality of the evidence presented. 67
A prima facie case need not unfailingly resemble the· prima facie
case in McDonnell Douglas because myriad sets of facts exist that

63
See Belton, supra note 24, at 1213-14 ("[T]he prima facie case doctrine helps to answer
the following question: In the absence of conflicting evidence, how much evidence on the
elements of his case should a plaintiff be required to submit in order to sustain a judgment in
his favor?").
64
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (stating that prima facie facts coupled with "rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination").
65
See Wells v. Gotfredson Motor Co., 709 F.2d 493, 496 n.l (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that "the
logical inference of discrimination arising from the prima facie evidence remains" even after
the mandatory presumption is rebutted).
66
See 411 U.S. at 802.
67
Cf Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 272 (4th Cir. 1980) (suggesting
that proof that plaintiff had better qualifications than the person hired might be sufficient to
sustain a verdict for the plaintiff); but cf East Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431
U.S. 395, 403-04 (1977) (holding that lack of qualification ends the possibility of a prima facie
case and a plaintiffs status as a class action representative).
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could support an inference of discrimination. 68 A court should not
dismiss a Title VII claim solely because the employee does not offer
a fact pattern that matches a previously presented Title VII prima
facie case. A court should dismiss a Title VII claim only if the
employee did not present evidence sufficient to sustain an inference
of discrimination. 69
A prima facie case and the fact finder's disbelief or partial
crediting of an employer's evidence allows the fact finder to determine that intentional discrimination probably occurred. 70 If an
employer's evidence is not believed, facts supporting the inference of
discrimination (i.e., the prima facie case) remain for the fact finder
to consider. The fact finder is clearly allowed to link the proven facts
to intentional discrimination because the remaining credible evidence
supports a permissible inference of discrimination. 71 Otherwise,
unrebutted evidence sufficient to support an inference of
discrimination at one point in the trial would be deemed insufficient
to support an inference of discrimination at another point. 72 That
every prima facie case contains facts sufficient to support an
68

See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13 (noting that the facts that constitute a Title
VII prima facie case will vary).
69
Indeed, establishing a prima facie case may not be necessary to recover. See United States
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) ("Where the defendant has
done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima
facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant.").
70
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The Burdine
Court recognized that the prima facie case "and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be
considered by the trier offact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual.
Indeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiffs initial evidence, combined with effective
cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation." Id.
at 255 n.10.
71
See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). Specifically, the Court
stated:
A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination
only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to
presume this largely because we know from our experience that more often than not
people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons,
especially in a business setting.
Id. (citation omitted).
72
See Calloway, supra note 59, at 1008 (suggesting that Hicks allows fact finders to discount
evidence underlying the prima facie case as being insufficient to create an inference of
discrimination). The Hicks majority may believe that the facts underlying a McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case are insufficient to support an inference of discrimination. See id. at
1007-09. If such facts are insufficient, once the presumption of discrimination is rebutted, all
that remains is a set of facts that cannot sustain a verdict for an employee. If this is the case,
the Court acted unconscionably in declining to provide some set ofprima facie facts that would
support an inference of discrimination.
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inference of discrimination is one of the engines that drives the
McDonnell Douglas test.

C.

The Burden of Production, Presumption of Discrimination and
Proffered Reasons

Under McDonnell Douglas, once a Title VII plaintiff presents a
prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the subject job
action. 73 The articulation of any legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason ("the proffered reason") meets the burden of production,
rebuts the presumption of discrimination, and effectively eliminates
the presumption from the case. 74 The employer does not need to
persuade the fact finder that the proffered reason actually motivated
the employer, because the employer has no burden of persuasion. 75
That the burden of production is light reflects the nature of the
presumption created by the prima facie case. 76 Controlled by Rule
301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 77 the presumption is a fragile
structure that collapses under the weight of any evidence challenging
it. Rule 30l's treatment of the presumption stems from the "bursting
bubble" theory of presumptions which advocates that the
presumption is a fragile link between the proven facts and the

73
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254;
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. An employer is free to present more than one legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason. In Hicks, the employer's two proffered reasons were "the severity
and the accumulation of rules violations committed by [Hicks]." 509 U.S. at 507.
74
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at507.
75
See FED. R. EVID. 301. In Burdine, "[t]he narrow question presented" was whether
defendant had to convince the court "that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
challenged employment action existed." 450 U.S. at 250. The Burdine Court answered the
question in the negative, stating "[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was
actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Id. at 254.
78
Some seem to find the burden of production almost nonexistent. In Bina v. Providence
College, 39 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1406 (1995), the court held that the
defendants met their burden of production when the district court judge found, in evidence
proffered by the plaintiff, legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons mentioned in the minutes of
a tenure committee meeting by a minority of members. See id. at 25. This allowed the
defendants to rebut the post-prima facie presumption of discrimination without ever formally
articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. See id. at 25-26.
77
Rule 301 states:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or
by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does
not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk ofnonpersuasion,
which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. Evm. 301.
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presumed fact. 78 Because evidence that the presumed fact is not
true breaks this link, the presumption bursts once such evidence is
presented. 79 In the Title VII context, an employer's proffered
reasons break the link. 80
1. How the Burden of Production Is Met

That the post prima facie presumption drops from the case after
an employer's articulation of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
is clear. 81 On what grounds a particular proffered reason is deemed
legitimate and non-discriminatory is not clear. 82 Determining how
an employer's burden of production is met ("BOP decision") is crucial
to determining whether the presumption drops from the case.
The BOP decision may seem irrelevant, given that the Court has
suggested that the McDonnell Douglas structure is irrelevant once
all the evidence has been presented. 83 It is not. In United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,84 the Court left the
McDonnell Douglas test intact until the presumption of
discrimination was rebutted, stating that"[w]here the defendant has
done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had
properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did
so is no longer relevant."85 The Court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence for the fact finder to decide whether intentional
discrimination occurred, even in the absence of proof of a prima facie

78
See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the
"Pretext·Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HAsTINGS L.J. 57, 104 n.65 (1991).
79
See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 40, at 808 n.21.
80
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
81
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993).
82
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court ruled that a refusal to rehire a laid-off employee based
on the employee's alleged participation in a stall-in and lock-in against McDonnell Douglas
constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 80304. During the stall-in, plaintiff and a number of others used their cars to block roads leading
to McDonnell Douglas' plant during rush hour. See id. at 794-95. The lock-in consisted of
placing padlocks on McDonnell Douglas' gates so that workers could not leave. See id. at 795.
Whether general lessons regarding what constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
can be drawn from McDonnell Douglas is unclear.
83
See, e.g., Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510, 521 (stating that "the McDonnell Douglas presumption
is a procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof and production"); United
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (holding that once the
defendant meets the burden of production required had the plaintiff made out a prima facie
case, whether the plaintiff in fact made out a prima facie case is not relevant).
84
460 U.S. 711 (1983).
Bl! Id. at 715.
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case. Bs
Interestingly, the presumption of discrimination was
eliminated only after the defendant "respond[ed] to the plaintiff's
proof by offering evidence of the reason for the plaintiff's rejection."B7 Thus, whether the employer has presented any legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason remains relevant throughout the trial
because failure to present any such reason in the face of a prima
facie case leaves an unrebutted presumption which yields a directed
verdict for the employee.BB
Arguably, the BOP decision is not particularly important because
the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas test serves the same
function. For reasons that will be clear later, the prior sentence is
true only if proof of falsity is equated with proof of pretext. B9 A fact
finder may find that a proffered reason was the true reason for the
job action, but that it was discriminatory, in which case the pretext
inquiry identifies discrimination. Conversely, the proffered reason
may be deemed false because the reason would not have been a
sufficient reason to fire a majority employee. After finding that an
employer proffered a reason that would not have caused a majority
member to be fired, but was used to fire a minority employee, the
fact finder could, but is not required to, find that discrimination did
not cause the job action. Thus the BOP and pretext decisions may
have very different effects. 90
What test is used to determine whether a reason is nondiscriminatory is crucial to the· BOP decision's usefulness. The
substance of the BOP decision-whether "non-discriminatory'' entails
disparate treatment or disparate impact type
discrimination-matters, because some discriminatory reasons that
seem non-discriminatory on their face will serve to meet an
86

See id.
Id. at 714-15.
88
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981); see also
Essary, supra note 15, at 399 (explaining that an employee prevails when a prima facie case
is unrebutted).
89
See discussion infra Part 111.D-D.3 (discussing the difference between a plaintiffs need
to show "pretext plus" or "pretext only").
90
Many, including the author, argue that the effects should be the same. See Charles A.
Sullivan, Accounting For Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1116 n.42 (1991) ("If the defendant's proffered reason is disbelieved,
there remains no 'legitimate nondiscriminatory reason' in evidence. Therefore, any inference
of discrimination from plaintiffs prima facie case remains unrebutted."); see also Marina C.
Szteinbok, Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment
Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1122 (1988) (After proof offalsity, "[t]he plaintiff
should prevail because the inference of discrimination arising from the prima facie case
remains unrebutted. ").
87
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employer's burden of production and rebut the mandatory
presumption. 91 Thus, the substance of the BOP d~cision could
diminish the effectiveness of the McDonnell Douglas test by
frustrating the desired effect of the mandatory presumption and the
shifting burden of production.
Three scenarios will demonstrate how the substance of the BOP
decision may affect the elimination of the mandatory presumption in
a Title VII case. In the first scenario, the employer's proffered
reason for the firing is the employee's race. In the second scenario,
the employer's proffered reason is the employee's membership in the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP). In the third scenario, the employer's proffered reason is
the employer's personal animus toward the employee.
In the first scenario, the substance of the BOP decision does not
matter. The employer fails to meet its burden of production because
the proffered reason is plainly discriminatory. The nature of the
discrimination is direct and obvious: the employee was fired because
he is a minority. If, in the face of a proven prima facie case, this
reason was the employer's only proffered reason, the employee
prevails because the unrebutted presumption requires a verdict for
the employee. 92
In the second scenario, where a black employee's NAACP membership is the ostensible reason for the firing, the substance of the BOP
decision matters. The substance matters because the proffered
reason may or may not be discriminatory. Assume that the court
takes judicial notice that most, but not all, members of the NAACP
are black and assume further that the employer knows the
demographics of the NAACP. Whether the proffered reason is
deemed non-discriminatory hinges on the definition of nondiscriminatory.93 If discriminatory is equated with disparate
impact type discrimination (discrimination where the effects fall
more harshly on minorities), the proffered reason should be deemed

91
See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. Disparate impact entails discriminatory
effect without regard to an employer's intent; disparate treatment entails intentional
discrimination based on membership in a protected class. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
92
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; see also Essary, supra note 15, at 399.
93
Even if the membership of the NAACP were all black, firing based on membership in the
NAACP might not be discriminatory if the employee's status as a member in the organization
caused the job action, rather than the employee's race.
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discriminatory, given its probable effect on blacks. 9,4 Regardless of
the employer's intent, widespread use of NAACP membership as a
reason for firing employees would result in the dismissal of a
substantially larger proportion of blacks than non-blacks. 95 If the
employer's widespread use of NAACP membership as a reason to fire
its employees is deemed discriminatory, a single use should be
deemed discriminatory as well. If the single use is discriminatory,
an unmet burden of production would remain, and the employer
would lose in the face of the mandatory presumption. 96
However, if the term "discriminatory" is eq~ated only with
disparate treatment type discrimination, NAACP membership could
be deemed a non-discriminatory reason~ as the job action arguably
did not hinge on race. Such a formulation could render the articulation standard almost worthless. Unless the employer specifically stated that the employee was fired because of his or her membership in a Title VII protected class, the proffered reason would be
deemed non-discriminatory. Although the pretext inquiry may
determine whether NAACP membership was the real reason for the
firing, that question has little bearing on whether the reason is
deemed non-discriminatory and sufficient to rebut the presumption
of discrimination. Under a disparate treatment type inquiry, the
NAACP membership (an arguably discriminatory reason) could serve
to rebut the presumption of discrimination. 97
The third scenario presents the most difficult and important case
because personal animus is keenly subjective and may be one of the
most conventional legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing
an employee. Indeed, personal animus was t}ie basis on which the
district court in Hicks found that discrimination had not been

94
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission uses a four-fifths rule to determine
when the impact on a minority group is sufficient to suggest discrimination. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4(D) (1995) (Selection procedures that yield "[a] selection rate for any race ... which
is less than four-fifths ... of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be
regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.").
95
Disparate treatment does not become disparate impact. "Non-discriminatory," in the
context of the articulation of proffered reasons, may be analyized in light of disparate impact
principles in some cases. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991, 999-1000
(1988).
96
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 528 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(explaining that if the employer does not meet its burden of production to overcome the
mandatory presumption, the plaintiff will receive judgment in his or her favor).
97
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1003 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (stating that in a disparate impact inquiry, the employer may rebut the
presumption with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason which raises a genuine issue of fact).
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proven. 98 Like most subjective reasons, personal animus may seem
non-discriminatory, even from a disparate impact perspective.
However, discretion is at the core of subjective decisionmaking.
Discretion allows for the use of any subjective reason; the discretion
may be applied either discriminatorily or non-discriminatorily.
Whether using a practice in a discriminatory manner is a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason sufficient to. rebut the mandatory
presumption of discrimination is very important. 99
Purely subjective employment policies that have a discriminatory
impact may leave employers liable for discrimination. 100 A proffered reason that has an unjustified discriminatory effect should be
deemed a discriminatory reason. If the reason proffered by an
employer is susceptible to discriminatory application and the
employer does not prove that it was used in a non-discriminatory
fashion, the presumption should stand unrebutted and the employee
should prevail. 101 For example, if a known Ku Klux Klan member
and proven racist was given unfettered discretion to fire employees,

98

See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970
F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The district court stated that the plaintiff
had not proven that the "crusade to terminate him ... was racially rather than personally
motivated." Id. at 1252.
99
The McDonnell Douglas Court tangentially reached this issue in ruling that McDonnell
Douglas' proffered reason for refusing to rehire plaintiff rebutted plaintiffs prima facie case,
but was lawful only ifit applied to all races equally. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803-04.
Seemingly, a reason that is applied discriminatorily rebuts the prima facie case. Either the
Court used a disparate treatment type definition of "non-discriminatory" in evaluating the
proffered reasons or the Court did not recognize that a distinction between a reason
discriminatory in nature and a reason discriminatory in practice would matter with respect
to the BOP decision. At the time McDonnell Douglas was decided, the Court did not need to
differentiate between a reason that is discriminatory in practice and one that is discriminatory
on its face. Pretext would have made the distinction irrelevant because the standard as it
existed at that time arguably would have required a verdict for the employee once the
employer's proffered reasons were shown to be false. See id. at 807.
100
See Watson, 487 U.S. at 988 ("This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that
some facially neutral employment practices may violate Title VII even in the absence of a
demonstrated discriminatory intent.").
101
Concern may attend any system that forces an employer to prove anything. Such
concern is misplaced. A system forcing an employer to prove that its reasons are legitimate
and non-discriminatory is not at odds with any Supreme Court ruling. While an employer
need only articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions in order to rebut
the inference of discrimination, the articulation of illegitimate or discriminatory reasons does
nothing to the presumption of discrimination. See Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp., 835
F.2d 793, 798 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the failure to consider a minority employee for
promotion (i.e., the plaintiff "'never entered [the defendant's] mind as a candidate for [the]
position'") is not a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason sufficient to rebut an inference of
discrimination), opinion amended on other grounds, 850 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1988).
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the grant of discretion is hardly non-discriminatory. If not, subjective reasons probably could never be deemed discriminatory. 102
The scenarios presented suggest that the Court has left important
questions respecting legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons open to
interpretation. These questions need to be answered because their
resolution may determine whether the presumption remains intact
or disappears upon an employer's articulation of facially nondiscriminatory reasons.
2. The Function of the Burden of Production
The burden of production and mandatory presumption force
employers to articulate the reasons for their job actions by affixing
judgment for an employee as a cost for an employer's refusal to aid
the search for the truth. 103 However, the burden of production and
mandatory presumption are not merely tolls. They aid the search for
truth and increase the accuracy of the verdict by ultimately helping
to determine what happened in the subject case. They accomplish
this by narrowing the fact finder's field of inquiry and by giving an
employee a fair opportunity to show that discrimination is the most
likely cause of the job action. 104 Focusing the discrimination
inquiry allows an employee a reasonable opportunity to prevail

102

This remains an open issue. In Furnco Construction Co. u. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978),
the hiring practices of Furnco's bricklayer superintendent were at issue. The superintendent
mostly selected workers whom he personally knew were able to handle the subject jobs. See
id. at 572. Petitioner Furnco argued that the selection method was "'a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [his] refusal to consider plaintiffs.'" Id. at 574 (quoting Waters v.
Furnco Constr. Corp., 551F.2d1085, 1088 (7th Cir. 1977)). Respondent-plaintiffs argued that
"the general hiring practice, though perhaps legitimate in the abstract, was discriminatorily
applied in this case, and cannot be used to rebut the prima facie case." Id. at 580 n.9. The
Furnco Court did not decide whether plaintiffs argument was cognizable, stating merely that
"respondents are of course free to pursue any such contentions which have been properly
preserved." Id. at 581 n.9.
103
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (holding that
employer's silence in the face of a prima facie case yields a verdict for employee).
104
See id. at 255-56. Ultimately, the burden of production allows an employee to prove what
she believed occurred. The Court explained that "[p]lacing this burden of production on the
defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiffs prima facie case by presenting a
legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that
the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Id.
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without burdening him or her with a monumental task. 105
Precisely how· to narrow the inquiry remains to be considered.
Two arguments regarding the McDonnell Douglas test's narrowing
function are found in Justice Scalia's majority opinion and Justice
Souter's dissent in Hicks. 106 The Hicks majority argues that the
McDonnell Douglas test narrows the inquiry from relevant background questions in the prima facie stage to the single ultimate
If intentional
question of intentional discrimination. 107
discrimination caused the job action, the employee prevails. 108 The
dissent argues that the McDonnell Douglas test narrows the inquiry
from the entire universe of reasons that could have caused the job
action, to a determination of whether the reasons the employer
P.roffers for the job action are a pretext for intentional
discrimination. 109 If the employer's proffered reasons are proven

105
Forcing an employee to disprove every conceivable reason for a job action is monumental.
Narrowing the inquiry to a few possible causes of the job action results in clear benefits. For
example, the judicial system can cabin the litigation. Discovery requests, interrogatories and
depositions would be unmanageable if the entire employer/employee relationship, as it related
to all possible causes of the job action, was examined. Similarly, the potential for an
unmanageable trial exists whenever the inquiry is not narrowed to some extent before trial.
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting
that discovery costs will rise with uncertainty about employer's reasons); see also Joseph M.
Pellicciotti, Proving the ADEA Claim: The Impact of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. Bus. 1, 19 (1995) (noting that "'the scope of permissible discovery now appears
to be much wider' after Hicks") (quoting James R. Neely, Jr., E.E.0.C., General Counsel's
Memorandum on Supreme Court's Hicks Decision, No. 743, in 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA)
405:7151, 405:7154); but cf. Essary, supra note 15, at 425 (suggesting that discovery costs
should not rise in the context of jury trials).
106
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 513-14 (Scalia, J., majority); id. at 525 (Souter, J., dissenting).
107
See id. at 513-14 (Scalia, J., majority).
106
See id. at 510 n.3.
109
See id. at 529-33 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter's reading is truer to McDonnell
Douglas than Justice Scalia's. The McDonnell Douglas Court assumed that the clash of the
parties' reasons would serve as the basis for the eventual decision on intentional discrimination
when it stated, "the issue at the trial on remand is framed by [the] opposing factual
contentions" made by the parties. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
McDonnell Douglas contended that Green's prior actions against McDonnell Douglas explained
McDonnell Douglas' refusal to rehire Green. See id. Green contended that racial
discrimination explained the decision. See id.; see also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) ("[T]he district court must decide which party's
explanation of the employer's motivation it believes."); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981) (stating that the defendant's burden of production will
"frame the factual issue" and also give the plaintiff an opportunity to discredit the defendant's
evidence).
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false, the employee wins because intentional discrimination is
deemed to be the reason for the job action. 110
Justices Scalia and Souter seem to agree that forcing an employer
to produce evidence supporting its job action underlies the· shifting
burden of production. m Justice Scalia argues that once evidence
that could explain the job action is produced, the purpose of the
burden of production has been met. 112 The fact finder's field of
view has been narrowed from all of the possible reasons that could
explain the job action, to those derived from the evidence
presented. 113 Of the thousands of legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for the job action that may exist, all have been excised from
the fact finder's consideration, save those that were articulated or
unarticulated but extant in record. 114 The inquiry has been narrowed. According to Justice Scalia, the fact finder will base a verdict
only on a reason culled from the evidence that could explain the
subject job action. 115 Consequently, all of the reasons that might
serve to explain the job action will be easily identifiable from the
trial record. 116
Conversely, Justice Souter argues that the McDonnell Douglas
test's narrowing function requires that the truth of the proffered
reasons be the focus of the inquiry. 117 The dissent's view may

0
"
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 532 (Souter, J., dissenting). An employee prevails even if
intentional discrimination is not the sole reason for the job action. See id. at 531-32.
Intentional discrimination and other reasons can combine to produce a single job action. See
Paul J. Gude!, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation ofAction and the Mixed Motives Problem
in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEx. L. REV. 17, 27-28 (1991) (noting that the sole
cause test has never been held to be the proper test; intentional discrimination need not be
only reason for job action). But see Hannah A. Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex
Problems: The Supreme Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title
VII, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 353, 371 (1984) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas formulation
suggests that an employer's reasons are singular).
111
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07 (Scalia, J., majority); id. at 528-29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
"Proof of a prima facie case thus serves as a catalyst obligating the employer to step forward
with an explanation for its actions." Id. at 529.
2
"
See id. at 516 (Scalia, J., majority).
113
See id.
114
See id.
115
See id. at 522-23. This argument is dubious, as the district court in Hicks could not have
based its verdict on evidence affirming personal animus between the parties because no such
evidence was presented. See id. at 542-43 (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing that all parties
denied that personal animus existed between plaintiff Hicks and his .supervisor). More
importantly, the only reason we know that is because Hicks was a bench trial in which the fact
finder was required to give reasons for the verdict. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F.
Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
116
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522-23 (Scalia, J., majority).
117
See id. at 533-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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assume that the shifted burden of production is designed to force
defendants to articulate the actual reasons for the job action, rather
than possible explanations for the job action. 118
Consequently,
although unarticulated reasons for the job action may exist, an
employer's refusal to articulate and proffer those reasons should
eliminate an employer's ability to use those reasons to shield itself
from Title VII liability. 119
The majority and dissent seem to create a hierarchy of reasons for
the job action. Three types of reasons other than intentional
discrimination that may explain a job action are: 1) proffered
reasons; 2) unproffered reasons discussed at trial; and 3) unmentioned reasons not extant in the trial record. 120 Justices Scalia and
Souter would agree that unmentioned reasons not extant in the trial
record cannot explain the job action and cannot be a basis for a
verdict. 121 Similarly, each would likely agree that proffered
reasons can explain the job action and be the basis for a verdict in
the employer's favor. 122 The dispute lies with using unproffered
reasons mentioned at trial as the basis for a verdict for the
employer. 123
Justice Scalia would allow their use in such
fashion; 124 Justice Souter would not. 125 The use of unproffered
reasons to support a verdict for employer is disturbing. 126
us See id.
9

For example, an employee sues alleging racial discrimination. The employer defends
citing plaintiffs absenteeism. In the course of the trial, the plaintiff proves that absenteeism
was never a problem and was not the reason for the firing. However, that plaintiff is a
homosexual and that his supervisor despises homosexuals is revealed at trial. The supervisor
denies a dislike for homosexuals and denies that plaintiffs sexuality was the cause for the
dismissal, in part to deflect possible bad publicity. The employer should not receive credit for
a defense that it has denied. First, the employee can hardly further discredit an unproffered
reason that has been denied. Second, the fact finder would need to be certain that the
employer would have fired a white homosexual just as it fired the minority homosexual.
Forcing the employee to find evidence that a majority group homosexual would not have been
fired for a reason that the employer claims did not cause plaintiffs firing is peculiar and
seemingly impossible.
120
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522-23 (Scalia, J., majority).
121
See id. at 510 n.3; id. at 538-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
122
See id. at 510 (Scalia, J., majority); id. at 530 (Souter, J., dissenting).
123
See id. at 522-24 (Scalia, J., majority); id. at 525, 528-30. See also Brookins, supra note
14, at 955 ("The Hicks Court seems to be asking whether any lawful reason exists and not
whether the specific reasons given by employers were lawful.").
124
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522-24 (Scalia, J., majority).
125
See id. at 528-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128
See Sullivan, supra note 89, at 1116 n.42. Allowing reasons not presented by defendant
to inform verdict is troublesome because such reasons are "especially unlikely to be true" and
because allowing "such [a] process may prevent the plaintiff from ever having the opportunity
to rebut the reason the court believes to be the 'true' one ...." Id. at 1117 n.42. See also
"
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Unproffered reasons are likely unreliable as possible explanations
for the job action, as neither party has suggested that the unproffered reason actually explains the job action. The burden of
production is used to force the employer to produce reasons that
actually explain the job action. 127 If the purpose of the burden of
production is to force the defendant to produce reasons that could
explain the job action rather than those that do, it will, in some
cases, be worthless. 128 If proffered reasons are merely reasons that
might explain the job action, an employer may have little incentive
to produce the true reasons for the job action except that reasons
that actually explain the job action are more likely to comport with
the evidence that is presented. 129 Rather, an employer has an
incentive to proffer the reasons most likely to suggest that intentional discrimination did not occur. 13° Consideration of unproffered
and unreliable reasons serves to decrease the accuracy of Title VII

Lanctot, supra note 77, at 116-17 (arguing that choosing an unproffered reason in the face of
employer's or employee's explanation is "inconsistent with the Burdine model."); Szteinbok,
supra note 89, at 1126. Ms. Szteinbok notes that
[t]he defendant's rebuttal ... also reduces the likelihood of factual error by focusing
the precise points of actual dispute. The explanation that the defendant articulates
in rebuttal will be tried and tested in an adversary context. In contrast, the truth
of a court-discerned motive remains in doubt when that reason is so dimly apparent
in the record that the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to challenge it.
Id.
127
For an insightful commentary on the utility and underlying rationale behind forcing
decision makers to give reasons for actions, see Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 633 (1995).
128
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 534 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court thus transforms the
employer's burden of production from a device used to provide notice and promote fairness into
a misleading and potentially useless ritual.").
129
For instance, in Hicks, the evidence that served as the basis for the lower court's ruling
seems to have been presented by the employee. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F.
Supp. 1244 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The
lower court determined that the employee had not proven that discrimination was the cause
of the firing. See id. at 1252. Further, the court decided that the cause was more likely than
not a personal vendetta against the plaintiff not motivated by race. See id. As the employer
denied that there was any animus toward the employee, it seems that the employee's evidence
of some vendetta was the key to this case. See id. St. Mary's did not produce any credible
evidence rebutting Hicks' claims of intentional discrimination; yet St. Mary's prevailed because
the fact finder searched into the record and found an unarticulated reasori that could have
explained the job action. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 542-43 (Souter, J., dissenting). "The Court
today decides to abandon the settled law that sets out th[e] structure for trying disparatetreatment Title VII cases, only to adopt a scheme that will be ... inexplicable in forgiving
employers who present false evidence in court." Id. at 533.
130
See id. at 533.
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verdicts by allowing unproffered reasons to be deemed the true
reasons for the subject job action. 131
The crediting of unproffered reasons also hampers an employee's
ability to prove his or her case. 132 The McDonnell Douglas Court
recognized that few employees could prove that intentional
discrimination had taken place without help from their
employer. 133 This ''help" came by forcing the employer to explain
precisely why the adverse job action took place and allowing that
explanation to become the lawsuit's battleground. 134 Armed with
the employer's reasons, the employee could isolate and eliminate
non-discriminatory reasons that could have served as legitimate
bases for the adverse job action. 135 Through this process, the
employee has a full and fair opportunity to test and rebut the
reasons identified by the employer as the basis for the job action. 136
Unproffered reasons are not and cannot be adequately tested or
rebutted. 137 Indeed, depending on the posture of the trial at the
time the unproffered reason appears, fully exploring an unproffered
reason may be inappropriate. 138
131

See id.
See id. at 534-35.
133
See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 406 U.S. 711, 715-17 (1983).
"There will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes." Id. at
716; see also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528-29 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining how the McDonnell
Douglas. formula fulfills the intent of Title VII).
134
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 526 (Souter, J., dissenting).
135
See id. at 527.
136
See id. at 533-34.
137
See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981). The Court
stated that "the defendant's explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably
specific. This obligation arises both from the necessity of rebutting the inference of
discrimination arising from the prima facie case and from the requirement that the plaintiff
be afforded 'a full and fair opportunity' to demonstrate pretext." Id. (citations omitted). See
also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 529-30 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Nor does it make any sense to tell the
employer ... that its explanation oflegitimate reasons 'must be clear and reasonably specific,'
if the factfinder can rely on a reason not clearly articulated, or one not articulated at all, to
.
rule in favor of the employer.").
138
Evidence on unproffered reasons should be deemed irrelevant under Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 because such evidence relates to a reason that has not been asserted and hence
cannot reasonably serve to explain the job action. Rule 401 states: "'Relevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." FED. R. Evm. 401. Alternatively, the evidence can be deemed relevant but
excludable under Rule 403 in cases such as Hicks, where all parties have denied that the
unproffered reason was the real reason for the job action. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by ... considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
132
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Determining what happened in the subject Title VII action is the
key to an accurate verdict. Testing the evidence is how the parties
prove what happened. Although the Hicks Court's view of the
burden of production's function may be flawed, the pretext step
provides a final opportunity for an employee to test an employer's
evidence; What effect the pretext stage has on the trial can be the
difference between getting it right and merely getting it done.

D. Pretext
Once the employer has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the job action, the McDonnell Douglas test moves to its
last stage, where an employee may demonstrate that the reason
offered by the employer is pretextual. 139 Pretext may be proven by
showing either that the proffered reason is unworthy of belief or that
intentional discrimination is a more likely explanation for the job
action. 140 The former method is proof of falsity and is the indirect
method of proof; the latter method is a restatement of the ultimate
issue underlying the traditional two-step structure and is the direct
method of proof. 141 Although the pretext step is the final step in
the McDonnell Douglas test, it is not dispositive. Under Hicks, proof
of pretext through proof of falsity does not guarantee a verdict for an
employee. 142 Even after the end of the pretext stage, this question
remains: Did the employer engage in intentional discrimination? 143
That this question remains is the linchpin of Hicks.
1. Hicks and Proof of Falsity
Prior to Hicks, the "pretext-plus" and "pretext-only" theories were
the two major schools of thought regarding the effect of proof of

139
See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1993). McDonnell Douglas gave
employees the right to challenge proffered reasons for discharge on the grounds that they were
discriminatory in application or were false. See id. at 805 ("[R]espondent must be given a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid
reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision.").
140
See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. A plaintiff may persuade the court that he or she had been
the victim of intentional discrimination "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Id.
141
See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
142
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515.
143
See Hicks 509 U.S. at 519 ("It is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer;
the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination.").
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falsity on Title VII trials. 144 Courts adhering to the "pretext-plus"
school believed that an· employee needed to prove the employer's
proffered reasons false and that additional evidence of intentional
discrimination existed in order to support an inference of
·discrimination through the indirect method of proof. 145 Judgment
in favor of an employer was proper if an employee failed to present
"pretext-plus" evidence. 146 Conversely, courts adhering to the
"pretext-only" school believed that evidence of falsity was sufficient
to support the inference of discrimination; proof of falsity alone
yielded a verdict for an employee. 147 The majority and dissenting
opinions in Hicks loosely parallel the "pretext-plus" and "pretextonly" views, respectively. 148
Whether proof of falsity is the functional equivalent of proof of
intentional discrimination is the question that drives the Hicks
dispute. The Hicks majority found that proof of falsity demonstrates
that reasons other than those proffered caused the job action, but not
that those other reasons necessarily constitute discrimination. 149
In order to prove that discrimination is the reason for the job action,
the employee may need additional evidence. 150

144
See generally, Lanctot, supra note 77, at 71-91 (contrasting the use of the two rules
among the various federal courts of appeal). "Courts have developed two opposing rules to
guide them in determining whether the employment discrimination plaintiffs have proven their
causes: the 'pretext-only' rule and the 'pretext-plus' rule." Id. at 71.
145
See id. at 87 (explaining that in a "pretext-plus" jurisdiction "a plaintiff'cannot meet his
burden of proving 'pretext' simply by refuting or questioning the defendant's articulated
reason'") (quoting White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042 (1st Cir. 1984). Cf. Brookins, supra
note 14, at 990-91 ("Arguably, advocates of the pretext-plus approach heavily discount proof
of falsity because they believe that inferences from that proof are too numerous or too weak
to establish unlawful discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence in the trial record as
a whole.").
146
See Essary, supra note 15, at 403-04 & n.82. Justice Souter suggests that pretext-plus
evidence will be necessary if proof of falsity does not require verdict for plaintiff. See Hicks,
509 U.S. at 534 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's view is a form of"pretextplus").
147
See Essary, supra note 15, at 403 & n. 78.
146
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-10 (Scalia, J., majority); id. at 532-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
See also Brookins, supra note 14, at 964 (placing Hicks "somewhere in the middle of pretextonly and pretext-plus circuits."); Essary, supra note 15, at 406 (noting that Hicks represents
a "unique version of the 'pretext-plus' doctrine.").
149
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514-15; See also Brookins, supra note 14, at 959 ("In short, the
Court reasoned that the logical or analytical gap between proof of falsity on the one hand and
proof of unlawful discrimination on the other is too great to support a factual inference or
nexus between them.").
150
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 535 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that some "pretext-plus"
evidence may be necessary under majority's opinion).
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Support for Justice Scalia's position flows from his focus on a
single sentence in Aikens stating that the ultimate issue in disparate
treatment cases is "discrimination vel non." 151 On the basis of that
sentence, the Hicks Court makes discrimination vel non the sole
object of the trial process, to the exclusion of alternative methods of
evidentiary analysis. 152 Proof of falsity becomes merely a step in
proving that intentional discrimination is the most likely explanation
for the job action. By casting the direct method of proof as the only
dispositive method of proof, Justice Scalia collapses the direct and
indirect methods of proof sanctioned by Burdine into a single method
of proof. 153
Conversely, Justice Souter suggests that proof of falsity and proof
of intentional discrimination are functionally equivalent. 154 Under
the indirect method, the question of pretext is the question of
intentional discrimination. 155
If all proffered reasons are
eliminated as causes of the job action, discrimination is proven just

151

United States Postal Serv. Bd. of G<>vernors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983).
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. The Aikens Court stated that discrimination vel non was the
ultimate issue in a case where an employer argued that no prima facie case had been made.
See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714. Specifically, the Court determined that whether a prima facie
case had been made was irrelevant once all evidence had been heard. See id. at 715. The
Aikens Court did not limit how discrimination vel non could be proven.
153
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 533-34 (Souter, J., dissenting). An employee is not likely to have
direct proof of discrimination. If he or she had direct evidence of discrimination, the prima
facie/mandatory inference process would not be relevant. The case would have been tried
without shifting burdens. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)
(noting that the McDonnell Douglas test is irrelevant when there is "direct evidence of
discrimination.").
The Thurston formulation might suggest that arguing that proof of falsity wins is odd. See
id. (recognizing that the respondent may prove a prima facie case of discrimination without
resorting to McDonnell Douglas). Arguably, if an employee has direct evidence of
discrimination, he or she would not get the benefit of the McDonnell Douglas presumptions.
That argument is misguided. Under Thurston, the ultimate issue would be decided without
presumptions because direct evidence on the issue existed. See id. Although an employee does
not prevail merely on presentation of direct evidence of discrimination, he or she is guaranteed
victory if the fact finder believes the direct evidence of discrimination. See id. (explaining that
the McDonnell Douglas formula is used when no direct evidence of discrimination exists).
Otherwise the fact finder finds for the defendant in the face of proof that discrimination caused
the job action.
154
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 530 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that under McDonnell
Douglas, if the plaintiff proves pretext in the employer's proffered reasons, "the court 'must
order a prompt and appropriate remedy."') (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 807 (1973)).
155
See Lanctot, supra note 77, at 71 ("[T]he plaintiff may prevail simply by showing that
the defendant's justification is untrue.").
152
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as surely as if direct evidence of discrimination itself were
presented. 156 Proffered reasons that are proven false, and that are
pretext for a reason that has not been proffered, are pretext for
nothing. Proof that no reason exists is proof of discrimination
because people rarely act without reason, and the facts underlying
the prima facie case suggest that discrimination was that reason. 157
Underlying Justice Souter's structure is theFurnco Court's assertion
that in the absence of a real reason for an adverse job action,
intentional discrimination is the most likely explanation. 158
Justice Souter's dissent in Hicks focuses on how evidence
presented under the McDonnell Douglas test informs the
discrimination issue. 159 His approach suggests that the indirect
method of proof under the McDonnell Douglas test is a wholly
adequate proof structure which may answer the question of intentional discrimination without explicitly reaching it. 160 The indirect
method of proof is a proxy for the direct method of proof and the
traditional two-step nonpresumptive proof structure. 161
The
dissent does not find intentional discrimination where none exists;
it simply views the indirect method of proof's inference of

158

As Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes said, "[w]hen you have eliminated the
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth." JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 577 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) (from ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE,
THE SIGN OF FOUR (1890)).
157
See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("[W]e are willing to
presume [that discrimination was the cause] largely because we know from our experience that
more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying
reasons.").
158
See id. at 577 ("Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an
impermissible consideration such as race."). See also Calloway, supra note 58, at 998
("Throughout the history of Title VII, this basic assumption [that in the absence of reasons,
adverse treatment of protected groups more likely than not resulted from discrimination] has
served as a cornerstone of disparate treatment actions.").
159
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528-29 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas
test requires "the employer to step forward with an explanation for its actions," thus identifying the factual issues). Approaching the issue of proof indirectly is a legitimate path. See
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 n.3 ("As in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or
circumstantial evidence .... Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the District Court
should not have required Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent.").
160
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 536 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that the employee "has
raised [the] inference of discrimination ... through proof of his prima facie case .. .").
161
See id. at 534 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that under Burdine, the plaintiff may prove
discrimination indirectly by casting doubt upon the explanation proffered by the employer).
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discrimination as a legitimate baseline from which to analyze a Title
VII case. 162
The issue is how to analyze the absence of a credible proffered
reason for a job action. Because the employer caused the job action,
the employer is the best source of information regarding the
cause. 163 The employer's lack of knowledge should not allow it to
prevail after the pretext stage, when such lack of knowledge would
not have done so if admitted just after the prima facie case was
proven. 164 Had the employer asserted just after the prima facie
case that it did not know what caused the job action, it would have
faced an unrebutted presumption of discrimination and lost.
Additionally, since the prima facie case was designed to force the
employer to present the real reason for the job action (or at least the
reason upon which the employer relies), the employer should lose if

162
See id. (stating that the process of "indirect proof is crucial to the success of most Title
VII claims" because employers who discriminate are unlikely to provide direct evidence of their
discriminatory motive).
163
Intuitively, ifthe employer cannot determine the cause of the job action, the risk ofloss
should fall on the employer. See Matthew D. O'Leary, Note, St. Mary's v. Hicks: The Supreme
Court Restricts the Indirect Method of Proof in Title VII Claims, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PuB. L. REV.
821, 844-45 n.152 (1994) (arguing that the employer should bear the risk); Szteinbok, supra
note 89, at 1131 ("Given that the law must resolve an open question against one party or
another, the risk of judicial error should fall upon the party that defrauds the court.") (citation
omitted). Of course, and employer may refuse to proffer the true reason. See Kenneth R.
Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 759 (1995) (suggesting that many non-discriminatory reasons
may exist for an employer's reluctance to provide the real reason). If an employer chooses this
course, the employer should not be heard to complain if he or she loses.
164
Seemingly, this formulation forces an employer to shoulder the burden of proving its
proffered reason; it does not. See Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After
Price Waterhouse and Wards Cove: Semantics as Substance, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 615, 652 n.283
(recognizing that the burden of proof functionally shifts to the defendant in every case in which
the fact finder believes the plaintiff's case). When the employer's evidence is the focus of the
trial and is not credible, the employer should not be treated as charitably as if its evidence
were believed.
An employee maintains the burden of proof as long as the court instructs the jury to find for
the employer unless the employee proves, by the preponderance of the evidence, one of three
things: 1) that proffered reasons are not the real reasons for the adverse job action; 2) that
intentional discrimination is more likely the explanation of the job action than the proffered
reasons; or 3) that intentional discrimination more likely than not caused the adverse action.
See id. at 653. Such an instruction would track the Burdine Court's view of pretext. See id.
The burden of persuasion on the question of intentional discrimination appears to shift only
because the truth of the asserted reasons is the relevant question, rather than the existence
of direct evidence of intentional discrimination. See id. at 656-57. The burden does not
shift-it vanishes-because intentional discrimination, as strictly construed, is no longer the
operative question.
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it fails to provide the real reason. 165 Otherwise, an employee must
first determine the employer's actual, but unproffered, reason and
then prove it is a pretext for discrimination in order to prevail. 166
Forcing an employee to determine what the proffered reason should
have been and debunk it is odd, given that the employee claims the
real reason for the job action was intentional discrimination.
The Burdine Court's statement that proof of falsity is a legitimate,
dispositive method of proof invigorated the McDonnell Douglas
Court's admonition that "respondent must be afforded a fair
opportunity to demonstrate that petitioner's assigned reason for
refusing to re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its application."167 The ruling provided an additional method to prove
discrimination. This expansion of methods of proof may have
resulted from the realization that discrimination can be insidious
and that its subtler forms can be difficult to prove directly. 168 If
the absence of reasons for a job action suggests that discrimination
likely occurred, presuming that fact to be true seems to fit the
preponderance of the evidence standard and accord with common
sense.
2. The Value of the Pretext Step
The majority's conception of the pretext step may stem from the
view that the McDonnell Douglas test is a disposable vehicle used

165

See Lanctot, supra note 77, at 133. Professor Lanctot notes:
[T]here is no rational reason for. giving a defendant who has lied about the reasons
for its actions a presumption that its lie does not conceal illegal conduct. In no other
area of the law would a lying defendant be accorded such solicitude. Ordinarily lack
of credibility may be considered as adverse evidence. . . . To presume that a
defendant who offered a false reason for its actions in court did so for a benign
reason is illogical.
Id. (citations omitted).
166
See Lanctot, supra note 77, at 122. Of course, cases where an employer is mistaken as
to the truth of the proffered reasons, but actually relied on the proffered reasons at the time
the job action occurred, would not support a finding of discrimination. See Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) ("The fact that a court may think that
the employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does not in itself expose him to
Title VII liability, although this may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are
pretexts for discrimination.") (citations omitted); Kralman v. Illinois Dep't ofVeterans' Affairs,
23 F.3d 150, 156-57 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that an honest mistake or bad business judgment
is not pretext); Lanctot, supra note 77, at 122 (noting that many courts assert that an
employer's mistaken belief regarding truth of proffered reasons is not discrimination).
167
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973).
168
See id. at 801 ("[I]t is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination,
subtle or otherwise.").
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solely to arrive at the ultimate question of discrimination. 169
Actually, the McDonnell Douglas structure has at least two specific
functions: 1) to enforce reasonable inferences; and 2) to provide an
orderly method to move the discrimination inquiry to conclusion. 170
Both functions help increase the accuracy of the system by internalizing facts that underlie the system.
The debate regarding the value of proof of falsity becomes one
regarding reasonable and proper inferences. The Hicks dissent
believes that proof of falsity provides evidence from which a fact
finder must infer discrimination. 171 The majority does not. 172
Although the pretext step seems to be the battleground, the essence
of the disagreement is what factual inferences may be drawn from
the prima facie case. 173 If one does not believe that the prima facie
case permits an inference of discrimination, proof of falsity will not
necessarily indicate that an inference of discrimination should be
drawn from the evidence. Conversely, if one believes that the prima
facie case creates an inference of discrimination, proof of falsity

169

See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks;509 U.S. 502, 521 (1993) ("[T]he McDonnell Douglas
presumption is a procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof and production."). See also, Essary, supra note 15, at 412 ("In fact, for all practical purposes, the model
of proof in circumstantial discrimination cases has come full circle to its pre-McDonnell
Douglas form which simply asks: 'Did the defendant intentionally discriminate against the
plaintiff?'").
170
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521 (stating that the McDonnell Douglas test is a procedural
device used to establish an order of proof and production).
171
See id. at 536-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172
See id. at 508-10 (Scalia, J., majority). Falsity provides evidence from which the fact
finder may infer discrimination. Id.
173
The legitimacy of the post prima facie inference rests on the tightness of fit between the
evidence presented and intentional discrimination. See Kovacic-Fleisher, supra note 163, at
627-28. If a tight fit between the prima facie case and intentional discrimination exists, the
fact finder should infer that intentional discrimination occurred even in the absence of the
presumption. At the time McDonnell Douglas and Furnco were decided, in the absence of
reasons that would normally cause a majority group member to be fired, it was very probably
the case that a qualified minority who had been fired had been the target of intentional
discrimination. The truth of the assumption drove the presumption. Had the assumption been
untrue, the presumption would have been factually unsupportable. The presumptive inference
rested on the reasonable factual inference. See id. Professor Kovacic-Fleischer suggests that
A factual inference differs from a presumption or presumptive inference in that it
is a conclusion that can be drawn logically from the evidence and could be the most
likely conclusion to draw from the facts. . . . If the fact finder believes that the
inferred facts exist and the court believes these facts are sufficient to meet the
party's burden of persuasion, then the burden of persuasion is fulfilled.
Id. at 627 (citations omitted). For example, no one would argue that proving the facts
underlying a prima facie discrimination case would allow the alteration of the allocation of
burdens of proof in an antitrust case. This is so because the facts underlying a Title VII prima
facie case do not suggest it is more likely than not that the defendant violated antitrust laws.
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likely strengthens that inference. Simply, the evidence supporting
the inference is stronger after proof of falsity. 174
Whether one believes that proof of falsity creates a factual
inference of discrimination likely affects how one views the McDonnell Douglas test's narrowing of issues. 175 If one believes that proof
of falsity creates a factual inference of discrimination, the McDonnell
Douglas test's sharpening of the inquiry is a logical progression,
narrowing the issues from the consideration of all reasons that could
have explained a job action, to consideration of the employer's
proffered reasons, to proof of falsity, which constitutes proof that
intentional discrimination occurred. Alternatively, one who does not
find that proof of falsity creates a factual inference of discrimination
probably views the progressive sharpening of the inquiry as one of
eliminating some reasons that could explain the job action, to
rejecting the proffered reasons as explanations, to the ultimate consideration of intentional discrimination as the reason for the job
action. This view is plausible, but problematic.
The latter conception of the narrowing function renders the pretext
step a rebuttal with no independent significance regarding the fact
of intentional discrimination. If the pretext step was intended to be
a mere rebuttal stage, one wonders why any serious attention was
paid to it after McDonnell Douglas, or why Burdine specifically
equated the indirect and direct methods of proof.
3. Pretext and Summary Judgment
The reconception of the pretext step and proof of falsity should
have serious implications for summary judgment and directed
verdicts in Title VII cases. In order to avoid summary judgment or
a directed verdict, a litigant must show that the fact finder has
sufficient evidence to rule in the litigant's favor. 176 Precisely how

174

Some who do not believe that the prima facie case creates an inference of discrimination
may believe that the inference exists after proof of falsity because the evidence in favor of
discrimination is stronger after proof of falsity.
176
Burdine made clear that the test was to have a narrowing function. Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981) ("[A]llocation of burdens and the
creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progressively
to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.").
176
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) ("[S]ummary judgment will not
lie ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party."); Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 163, at 630 ("One way that the plaintiff can survive a
motion for a directed verdict is to produce evidence which, if believed, would allow or compel
a verdict for the plaintiff ....").
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much evidence is necessary to sustain a verdict in an employee's
favor is unclear. A prima facie case coupled with proof of falsity is
sufficient to support a verdict for an employee. 177 However, if an
employee lacks additional evidence with respect to discriminatory
intent, what allows a fact finder to find for or against an employee
is unclear. 178 The quantum of evidence necessary to allow the fact
finder to rule for a plaintiff is a core question informing the "pretext
only/pretext plus" argument. 179
If proof of falsity says little or nothing regarding whether
intentional discrimination occurred, an employee who proves falsity
may not have significant evidence regarding intentional
discrimination. Without evidence on the ultimate fact question, how
an employee escapes summary judgment or a directed verdict is a
mystery. 18° Conversely, if an employee can prevail with just the
prima facie case and proof of falsity, an employee should rarely, if
ever, lose on summary judgment. 181

177

See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
For example, the Sixth Circuit has ruled that the facts underlying a prima facie case are
not enough to prove pretext. See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078,
1084 (6th Cir. 1994).
179
What constitutes sufficient "pretext-plus" evidence to allow an employee to prevail is
unclear. Bias, racial or otherwise, does not seem to constitute direct evidence of
discrimination. See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 50, at 57 n.317 (noting that statements
directly revealing state of mind may not constitute direct evidence of discrimination); Gudel,
supra note 109, at 49-50 (stating that racial slurs and statements regarding why an employee
was fired does not constitute direct evidence that the employee was fired because of race);
Sullivan, supra note 89, at 1118-19 (stating that evidence of actual bias does not prove
dismissal was based on discriminatory intent); Michael A. Zubrensky, Despite the Smoke, There
Is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L. REV. 959, 981 (1994) (same). Evidence of bias may be
circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination, but so is proof offalsity. If"pretext-plus"
evidence must be direct evidence of discriminatory intent, plaintiff employees may be doomed.
See Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 50, at 47 ("Evidence scholars have long recognized that one
can never prove state of mind directly; one can only glimpse its presence circumstantially.")
180
The sheer weight of the standards for directed verdicts and its equivalents may
discourage courts from granting them. See Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep't, 71F.3d801, 805
(11th Cir. 1995) ("A judgment as a matter of law may be affirmed only when 'the facts and
inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant ... that reasonable people could not
arrive at a contrary verdict.'") (quoting Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60
F.3d 734, 739 (11th Cir. 1995)). See generally Davis, supra note 162, at 738-40 (expressing
confusion regarding the application of summary judgment after Hicks).
181
See Essary, supra note 15, at 433 ("Justice Scalia's remarks logically lead to this result:
raising a genuine issue of fact regarding the credibility of the employer's proffered reasons
should defeat the employer's motion for summary judgment."); see also Tim D. Gray, Note,
Summary Judgment and Rule 301 After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 15 MISS. C. L. REv.
217, 239-40 (1994) (questioning whether summary judgment should be allowed in cases like
Hicks given that proof of pretext through cross examination is sufficient to sustain judgment
178
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Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a permissible
inference of discrimination has been established. 182 All that an
employer can present at the summary judgment stage are reasons for
the job action. 183 In order for the employer to prevail on summary
judgment, the court would have to rule that the employer's proffered
reasons are its real reasons, that the reasons have no discriminatory
taint, and that the reasons were not used in a discriminatory
manner. 184 Such a ruling seems to involve determinations that the
court cannot make at the summary judgment stage. 185
IV. EFFECTS OF THE ABANDONMENT OF FALSITY AS PROOF OF
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION

The elimination of proof of falsity as proof of discrimination has
rewritten the McDonnell Douglas test and lowered an employee's
likelihood of success. Additionally, the change wrought by the Hicks
gloss on the McDonnell Douglas test will likely produce a less
accurate Title VII system. The new system will have at least three
clear negative effects. First, the effects of fact finder bias will
increase, because juries are now allowed to credit putative
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons that have no basis in the
evidence. Second, employers will benefit from not being believed.
Third, the effective level of proof will increase, resulting in justice
denied.

for employee). Cf. Steven D. Smith, Comment, The Effect of Presumptions on Motions For
Summary Judgment in Federal Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1115 (1984) (arguing that unless
the movant forecloses the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant may
prevail at summary judgment stage without answering).
182
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506 (stating that once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case
there is a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee).
183
See id. at 507.
184
See Essary, supra note 15, at 432. Only such proof would foreclose a finding of
intentional discrimination. See id. at 433. Today, this may not be a concern for employers.
See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 231 (1993) ("There is
a further perversion of the McDonnell Douglas I Burdine formula in the summary judgment
context. Courts believe defendants when they articulate their non-discriminatory reasons for
the employment decision and disbelieve plaintiffs when they attempt to prove that defendants'
articulated reasons are pretextual.") (citation omitted).
186
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("Credibility determinations,
the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for
a directed verdict.").
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The New System Courts Fact Finder Bias

Under Hicks, the fact finder may unearth innate bias and systematically misinterpret evidence to an employee's detriment. 186
Fact finders are encouraged to search for reasons other than those
proffered in order to exculpate employers and may ignore relevant
evidence and the inferences flowing from it. 187 Fears that a fact
finder will rely on an unproffered reason to deny recovery to an
employee who has proven the falsity of the employer's proffered
explanation are well-founded. 188 Indeed, the Hicks district court
decision rested on an unproffered reason. 189
The Hicks facts provide an important example. After plaintiff
Hicks proved a prima facie case, St. Mary's Honor Center claimed
that Hicks was fired because of the number and severity of disciplinary violations against him, including a threat against his

186
See Calloway, supra note 58, at 998 ("When the Supreme Court in Hicks refused to
recognize a presumption of discrimination based on a prima facie case and a discredited
nondiscriminatory explanation, the Court both questioned the continued prevalence of
discrimination and invited lower court judges and juries to do the same."). The bias may be
against Title VII rather than against any particular group protected under Title VII.
187
Strangely, the Court allows reasons that would not have been sufficient to meet an
employer's burden of production, because they were not articulated, to destroy an employee's
inference of discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1993)
(noting that although the employer's proffered reasons were pretextual. the plaintiff did not
prove racial discrimination). Hypothetical reasons are not sufficient to meet the burden of
production. See Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[A]n employer
may not satisfy its burden of production by offering a justification which the employer either
did not know or did not consider at the time the decision was made.").
188
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 534-35 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiff is
confronted with disproving all reasons extant in the record, not just those proffered by the
employer). Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit has determined that a fact finder that simply
judges an employer's proffered reasons not credible has acted improperly. See Manzer v.
Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1994) ("The jury may not
reject an employer's explanation ... unless there is a sufficient basis in the evidence for doing
so.").
189
See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F.Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991); see also
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508. The Court stated:
The District Court, acting as trier of fact in this bench trial, found that the reasons
petitioners gave were not the real reasons for respondent's demotion and discharge. . . . [T]he District Court concluded that "although [respondent] has proven
the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven that the crusade was
racially rather than personally motivated."
Id. (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1250-52 (E.D. Mo. 1991)); see
also Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146,
148 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that a fact finder may refuse to credit both employer's or
employee's proffered cause of the job action).
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supervisor. 190 St. Mary's asserted no other reasons for the
firing. 191 Hicks proved that the reasons proffered by St. Mary's·
were false. 192 However, Hicks' burden of persuasion forced him to·
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that unlawful
discrimination occurred. 193
Once all the evidence had been presented, the fact finder had only
the prima facie case and proof of falsity as credible evidence on
which to base its verdict. Although no evidence suggesting personal
animus as the cause of the firing had been offered, the fact finder
determined that personal animus could have explained the firing and
ruled against Hicks. 194 In affirming the verdict, the Hicks majority
appears to allow speculation regarding the possible reasons for the
subject job action where none should exist.
Once a fact finder has determined that an employer's proffered
reasons are not the real reasons for the job action, no issue of fact
remains. 195 When the prima facie case and proof of falsity remain
as the only credible evidence, a fact finder ought to conclude that
discrimination more likely than not occurred.
Intentional
discrimination remains a factual issue, but not one that can be
resolved through resort to the evidence presented. 196 The debate

190

See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 505-07.
That other possible explanations existed should have been discounted unless St. Mary's
affirmatively asserted one as a reason for the firing. For instance, Martians could have visited
the decision maker and convinced him that Hicks should be fired. Were Hicks' attorney to ask
if Martians appeared to the decision maker instructing him to fire Hicks and the decision
maker answered negatively, the possible existence of a Martian instruction would hardly be
an acceptable basis for the fact finder's verdict. In Hicks, personal animus was deemed a
possible explanation, though the St. Mary's decision maker denied personal animus between
him and Hicks. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 543 (Souter, J., dissenting).
192
See id. at 508 (Scalia, J., majority).
193
See id.
194
See id.
196
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
254 (1981). Both the Burdine and Hicks CoUrts recognized that no issue offact exists just after
a prima facie case is presented. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). No issue of fact exists because the employer's burden of
production is not met. Though a factual debate regarding the existence of intentional
discrimination could have occurred, no legal debate remained. The presumption forced the fact
finder to render a particular verdict. If the Burdine and Hicks Courts meant that the prima
facie facts alone actually proved that intentional discrimination occurred, proof of falsity would
have required a verdict in the employee's favor since proof of falsity leaves the prima facie facts
and their inferences intact. See Brookins, supra note 14, at 970-71 (suggesting that because
articulating a legitimate reason creates the issue of fact, proof of falsity should resolve that
issue).
196
See Calloway, supra note 58, at 1009. An unrebutted prima facie case creates an
inference of discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
191
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about intentional discrimination can occur, but must be informed by
something other than the evidence presented. The verdict will be
based on the fact finder's life experiences. 197 In Hicks, the district
court's decision hinged on its personal experiences suggesting that
personal animus often causes employees to be fired. 198
Allowing the fact finder to search for an unproffered, legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason to support a verdict for an employer is
problematic. Although the fact finder's function is to find facts and
interpret evidence, that function is discharged once the evidence
yields a single reasonable conclusion. 199 Allowing additional
interpretation in such a context is wasteful and invites error. The
fact finder's interpretation will become speculation centered on
unproffered reasons unexplored by an employee. 200 Unexplored
reasons are likely to be unreliable because an employee has no
reasonable opportunity to test or rebut those reasons. 201 The
system's newfound reliance on reasons that an employee has no
reasonable opportunity to rebut is the real manner in which
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine were overruled. Those cases had
guaranteed an employee the opportunity to prove pretext regarding
an employer's defenses to Title VII liability. 202
If a case is put to a fact finder without direct evidence supporting
either the proffered reasons or intentional discrimination as the

U.S. 567, 577 (1978). Without evidence to meet the inference, a fact finder's rejection of the
inference cannot be based on the evidence.
197
See Calloway, supra note 58, at 1009 ("What evidence makes it 'more likely than not' that
the defendant discriminated? The answer to this question depends on one's beliefs about the
prevalence of discrimination.").
198
See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1992), reu'd, 509 U.S. 502
(1993).
199
Presumptions help guarantee that the fact finders reach the single reasonable conclusion.
See Calloway, supra note 58, at 1037.
200
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 543 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("It is hardly surprising that Hicks failed
to prove anything about this supposed personal crusade [to terminate him], since St. Mary's
never articulated such an explanation for Hicks's discharge, and since the person who allegedly
conducted this crusade denied at trial any personal difficulties between himself and Hicks.").
Of course, the possibility remains that personal animus existed, was racially motivated and
was discriminatory.
201
See Brookins, supra note 14, at 993 (noting that Burdine requires clearly articulated
reasons so that the plaintiff has an opportunity to rebut them).
202
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) ("On remand,
respondent must ... be afforded a fair opportunity to show that petitioner's stated reason for
respondent's rejection was in fact pretext."); id. at 805 ("In short, on the retrial respondent
must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the
presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision.").
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cause of the job action, the fact finder's verdict will be a referendum
on the fact finder's perceived prevalence of intentional discrimination
in society. 203 This must be so, because the only question the fact
finder can answer is whether discrimination more likely than not
occurred, given that no evidence to the contrary was presented. That
process is probably not what Congress intended when it granted Title
VII plaintiffs the right to jury trials. 204
B. Employers Benefit From Disbelief
Now that any unproffered reason extant in the record may support
a verdict for an employer, employers may benefit by denying that a
particular reason caused the job action and having their denial
disbelieved. An employer benefits because disbelief leads to proof of
falsity, which then allows the fact finder to search for unproffered
reasons that employees will not likely attempt to disprove. 205
For example, assume that an employee files a Title VII suit after
being fired. The employer proffers excessive tardiness as the only
reason for the firing. Although the employee disproves the proffered
reason, evidence is presented at trial about rumors that the
employee is homosexual. The employee's supervisor denies that the
rumors were the basis for the employee's dismissal. Consideration
of the rumors as the real reason for the dismissal should end. No
evidence has been presented suggesting that the rumors caused the
firing. Although evidence has been _presented suggesting that the
rumors existed, all evidence suggests that the rumors did not cause
the firing. Nonetheless, the rumors may be considered a reason for
the dismissal that the employee has failed to conclusively disprove.

203

See Brookins, supra note 14, at 956 n.105. Professor Brookins states:
It is also interesting to note that when Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, it proscribed jury trials out of fear that juries would prejudice blacks.
In contrast, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 permits jury trials, arguably because women
and minorities might stand a better chance of prevailing before juries than before
Reagan appointees.
Id. at 956 n.105. Cf Fayssoux, supra note 49, at 629 (suggesting that the judiciary believes
that juries are biased against employers in the ADEA context).
204
See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 694 (stating
that the purpose of the Act was, in part, to restore "the civil rights protections that were
dramatically limited" by Supreme Court decisions). See also supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
205
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508. In Hicks, proof of falsity allowed the fact finder to credit an
explanation that Hicks and St. Mary's denied: that personal animus played a part in the
decision to terminate Hicks. See supra notes 114, 187-88 and accompanying text.
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Allowing the rumors of homosexuality to be deemed the firing's
cause is problematic because the employee has done all that common
sense dictates to prove that the rumors did not provide the real
reason. Continued exploration of the rumors as the cause of the job
action might lead the fact finder to believe that the rumors caused
the job action. Practically, the employee should not continue to
expend resources to prove a fact about which both parties ostensibly
agree: that the rumors were not the reason for the dismissal. 206 In
addition to cost considerations, extended discussion of seeming
irrelevancies will tend to dilute the balance of the employee's
case. 207
·
Consider what the employee must show to prove that the denied
reason was not the actual reason for the dismissal. The employee
would have to treat the reason as if it were proffered, then disprove
it. The employee could prove that no rumors of homosexuality ever
existed, that the rumors did not cause the firing, or that the rumors'
use masked intentional discrimination. 208 Proving that the rumors
never existed or that the rumors were not the real reason for the job
action involves evidence that is usually presented in any event.
However, once the supervisor denies that the rumors precipitated the
job action, any additional evidence regarding the rumors could be
excluded. 209
Proving that the reason employee was fired was discriminatory
and that the rumors actually masked the discrimination is more
difficult due to the nature of the evidence that would have to be
206
Although an employer's proffer may be untrue, its falsity does not contradict the
employee's case. The employee claims that intentional discrimination, rather than the
proffered reason, caused the job action.
207
Indeed, the employee may be forestalled from asking about a denied "reason" by the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 402 prohibits the admission of irrelevant material. FED. R.
Evrn. 402; see also supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of
unproffered evidence). Before Hicks, an attempt to disprove a reason denied as the cause of
a firing could hardly be deemed an attempt to introduce relevant information. Such evidence
has become relevant, however, because an employee must now disprove unproffered reasons
extant in the record to prevail. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515-17 (explaining an employee's burden
ofprooO.
208
Of course, in order to prove that the unproffered reason was not the real reason, an
employee would likely have to procure testimony from current employees. Although that task
might seem monumental, the Hicks majority had no problem placing this burden on the
employee. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 516-17; see also Kristen T. Saam, Note, Rewarding
Employers' Lies: Making Intentional Discrimination Under Title VII Harder To Prove, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 711-12 (1995) (suggesting that it is more common and more difficult for
an employee to elicit testimony from current employees than for an employer to elicit
testimony from a disgruntled former employee).
209
See FED. R. Evrn. 403 (allowing the exclusion of cumulative evidence).
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presented. The employee would need to show that rumors about
majority group members' sexuality would have been or were treated
differently than rumors about the employee's sexuality. 210
Evidence supporting such a showing would almost certainly be
prohibited as an irrelevant invasion of privacy or an attempt to
embarrass or harass employees with insubstantial connection to the
Title VII case.
By denying the rumors as the cause of the job action, the employer
forestalls inquiry regarding the rumors. The employer prevails if the
jury believes that the employee's sexuality is the real reason for the
job action. Although the employee will have been effectively
precluded from presenting evidence to show that the reason is either
illegitimate or discriminatory, the fact finder may determine that the
employee could not conclusively discount the rumors of
homosexuality as the job action's cause.
Incorrect verdicts result precisely because no serious inquiry is
made regarding the denied reason. 211 If the rumors were not the
job action's cause, injustice occurs because the verdict rests on an
incorrect fact. If the rumors caused the job action, injustice occurs
because the employee did not have a reasonable opportunity to prove
that firing based on the rumors was colored by discriminatory
bias. 212
Arguably, existing civil justice system remedies, such as penalties
for perjury, solve these problems. 213 However, perjury charges and
other remedies are only appropriate to correct the harm caused by
lying. While the benefit from lying is the destruction of the
presumption of discrimination, the benefit from not being believed is
the forestalling of the inquiry. The pretext step may reverse some
210
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) ("Especially relevant
to such a showing [of pretext] would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against
petitioner [McDonnell Douglas] of comparable seriousness ... were nevertheless retained or
rehired.").
211
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 538 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that it is unclear whether a
trial court would even admit evidence that may not relevant to the reasons proffered by the
employer).
212
Additional danger accompanies cases in which the denied reason is unseemly but would
lead a significant number of people to dismiss the employee. The decisionmaker denies that
the unseemly reason caused the job action, while the fact finder considers whether the reason
could have caused the job action. The fact finder's conclusion may track the fact finder's belief
as to whether the unproffered reason could have caused the decisionmaker to fire the
employee. As the prevalence of sentiment that the denied reason could have caused the firing
rises, the likelihood of an employee's success falls.
213
Cf. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 520-22 (discussing the procedural impact of perjury and stating
that employers who give evidence that is disbelieved are not necessarily perjurers.) .
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of the benefit of lying; it will not reverse the employer's benefit from
not being believed.

C.

The Effective Level of Proof Is Heightened

1. Certainty and the Burden of Proof

Every burden of proof assumes some level of fact finder certainty:
the higher the level of certainty, the higher the burden of proof. 214
Accordingly, the reasonable doubt standard requires that the fact
finder be more certain than the clear and convincing standard, which
requires that the fact finder be more certain than the preponderance
of the evidence standard. 215 The Hicks Court has raised the fact
finder's requisite level of certainty for an employee to prevail and has
heightened the employee's burden of proof. 216
The desire for certainty may stem from the mistaken belief that
every fact can be proven to a certainty. Whether New York City has
more residents than Los Angeles is a fact that can be proven to a
certainty through reference materials. Regardless of the answer, its
accuracy is unquestioned. Conversely, whether New York City is a
more cosmopolitan city than Los Angeles is a matter that can be
argued, but not proven. The answer is not susceptible to certainty.

214
See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (comparing the level of certainty necessary
for a party to prevail where the standard of proof required is a preponderance of the evidence
versus beyond a reasonable doubt).
215
See id. Since Title VII actions are civil actions, conclusive proof is not required for
employer liability. See 3 EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS§ 72.01, at 32 (4th ed. 1987) ("To 'establish by a preponderance of the evidence' means
to prove that something is more likely so than not so. . . . This rule does not, of course, require
proof to an absolute certainty, since proof to an absolute certainty is seldom possible in any
case."); Belton, supra note 24, at 1220 n.56. The preponderance of the evidence standard
requires that
[T]he trier of fact must believe that it is more probable that the facts are true or exist
than it is that they are false or do not exist; but, it is not necessary to believe that there
is a high probability that they are true or exist, or necessary to believe to a point of
almost certainty, or beyond a reasonable doubt, that they are true or exist, or necessary
to believe that they certainly are true or exist.
Id. (quoting J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 261
(1944)).
216
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514-15 (declaring that the fact finder must determine that the
employer has unlawfully discriminated and not merely that the employer's explanation for the
job action is unbelievable); id. at 511 (stating that the McDonnell Douglas presumption does
not shift the burden of production away from the employee, who bears the burden of persuasion
as well). One commentator has suggested that a fear of false positives drove the Hicks
majority's attempt to eliminate all false positives. Culp, supra note 15, at 249-50.
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No matter what answer is given, it is arguably incorrect. Similarly,
whether intentional discrimination exists in a Title VII case is an
issue not susceptible to certainty, although courts analyze it as if it
is. 211
The expectation that discrimination can be proven to a certainty
causes problems. If a fact can be proven to a certainty, the burden
of proof does not matter. Any burden of proof can be surpassed
because the fact can be proven to a certainty. 218 Conversely, when
a fact cannot be proven to a certainty, the burden is crucial because
it can be dispositive. 219 If the burden is set correctly, a party that
is unable to meet the burden loses because the merits of its case
have not been proven. If the burden is set too high, a party may lose
because the evidence that conclusively proves the party's case does
not exist or is extraordinarily burdensome to gather.
Ignoring the changes in the burden of proof that attend alterations
of requisite levels of certainty may explain Hicks. If one were asked
if intentional discrimination occurred in Hicks, the answer might be
If one were asked whether intentional
"I am not sure."
discrimination more likely than not occurred, the answer would
necessarily be "yes" or "no." One can be certain that an event more
likely than not occurred and yet be uncertain that the same event
actually occurred. Under a reasonable doubt standard, an employer
would prevail when the fact finder is uncertain that intentional
discrimination occurred. 220 Under a preponderance of the evidence

217
Cf. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983)
(holding that intentional discrimination is to be treated like any other disputed question of fact
in civil litigation).
218
For example, the burden of proof would not matter in a trial where the issue was
whether New York City was more populous than Los Angeles. Even if the burden of proof was
beyond a shadow of a doubt, counting the cities' residents would prove which city is more
populous.
219
See Furnish, supra note 109, at 354 (recognizing that "the allocation of the burdens of
proof may be the decisive factor" when proof of intent is the issue); Belton, supra note 24, at
1207. Professor Belton notes that:
[T]he allocation of the burdens of proof during trial often has a significant effect on
the outcome of a case and frequently may be dispositive. Indeed, the concept of a
burden of proof ... helps implement the substantive laws by instructing the
factfinder on the degree of confidence he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of case.
Id. (citations omitted).
22
° Certainty is the essence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally, Victor v.
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 12 (1994) ("Proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt' ... is proof 'to a moral
certainty,' as distinguished from an absolute certainty.") (citations omitted).
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standard, an employee prevails when the fact finder believes that
discrimination probably occurred. 221
Arguably, Hicks embraces the preponderance of the evidence
standard because it requires only that intentional discrimination
more likely than not occured. 222 However, this requirement affords
at least three constructions, each of which heightens the burden of
proof.
The first construction considers whether intentional
discrimination is more likely than each reason in the record. The
second construction considers whether intentional discrimination is
more likely than the entire set of possible reasons extant in the
record. The third construction considers whether intentional
discrimination is more likely than all alternative reasons, including
those outside of the record.
The first construction would be the employee's most favorable view
of Hicks. This construction suggests that Hicks requires the fact
finder to conclude that some particular reason other than intentional
discrimination caused the job action. The operative question would
be whether intentional discrimination was a more likely explanation
for the job action than the reason the fact finder chose as the job
action's cause. Though an employee might not know which reason
the fact finder would select, that only one alternative explanation
would be compared to discrimination is better than the second
construction.
The second construction is the construction most likely intended
by the Hicks majority. 223 A focus on intentional discrimination,
rather than the reasons negating discrimination, underlies this
construction. The construction also allows the fact finder to
determine that several reasons could have combined to cause the job
action. 224 The operative question is whether discrimination was
221

See DEVI'IT, supra note 214, § 72.01, at 32; Belton, supra note 24, at 1220 n.56. The clear
and convincing standard requires that the fact finder believe
that it is highly probable that the facts are true or exist; while it is not necessary to
believe to the point of almost certainty, or beyond a reasonable doubt that they are
true or exist, or that they certainly are true or exist; yet it is not sufficient to believe
that it is merely more probable that they are true or exist than it is that they are
false or do not exist.
J.P McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 262-63 (1944).
222
See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993) (stating that the burden of
proof for a prima facie case. is a preponderance standard).
223
Given Justice Scalia's belief that the fact finder will not go outside of the evidence
presented to find alternatives to discrimination, this construction is probably preferred by the
Hicks majority. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 522-23.
224
Of course, several factors may combine to cause a job action. See Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 284 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (recognizing that discriminatory
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more likely the cause than the group of alternative explanations
existing in the trial record.
A fact finder will most likely internalize the third construction.
The only distinction between the second and third constructions is
the former's requirement that each possible cause of the job action
be mentioned in the trial record. The focus under both the second
and third constructions is whether intentional discrimination caused
the job action, rather than whether other reasons failed to cause the
job action. Any alternative explanation, whether or not mentioned
in the record, could serve to suggest that intentional discrimination
did not cause the job action. Although the Hicks majority suggests
that a fact finder will not credit an explanation without supporting
evidence, the Hicks district court did just that. 225
In order to make the distinction between the second and third
constructions, a fact finder must recognize that intentional
discrimination is the fact to be proven and that alternative
explanations to intentional discrimination will suggest that the
employee has not met his or her burden of proof. Additionally, a fact
finder must recognize that alternative explanations for the job action
gleaned from the fact finder's background, rather than the evidence,
do not suggest that an employee has not met his burden of proof.
That a fact finder would recognize the distinction is unlikely.
Under each construction, the burden of proof is higher than that
placed on an employee by the McDonnell Douglas I Burdine
framework. In order to prove that discrimination more likely than
not occurred, at a minimum, an employee must disprove all proffered
and unproffered reasons in the record. Since the McDonnell
Douglas I Burdine test states that merely disproving an employer's
proffered reasons meets the preponderance of the evidence burden as
a matter of law, 226 disproving all proffered and unproffered reasons
is a higher burden of proof than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. Though proof of falsity does not indicate that intentional
discrimination actually occurred, proof of falsity is proof beyond a
preponderance of the evidence.

and nondiscriminatory motives may combine to cause job action).
22
~ See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F.Supp. 1244, 1250-52 (E.D. Mo. 1991); see also
Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 491 (8th Cir., 1992) ("[l]t was improper for the
district court to assum~without evidence to support its assumption-that defendant's actions
were somehow 'personally motivated.'").
226
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 256 ·(1981).
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That the burden of proof has risen seems clear. How high the
burden has risen is dependant on the quantum of proof the fact
finder requires in order to find that discrimination occurred. What
that quantum of proof is depends on the fact finder's background.
2. False Positives and False Negatives
An unstated goal of the Hicks majority is to eliminate false
positives in Title VII disparate treatment cases. 227 A false positive
is a verdict which finds a non-discriminating employer liable for
discrimination. 228 That many non-discriminating employers may
be found liable under the McDonnell Douglas I Burdine test was the
intellectual cornerstone on which the Hicks majority based its ruling
that proof of falsity does not require a verdict in an employee's
favor. 229 Indeed, Justice Scalia's expression of outrage that an
employer whose work force is predominantly minority, and whose
decisionmaker is of the same race as the plaintiff employee, could be
held liable under Title VII based on proof of falsity suggests that the
Hicks majority's only goal was to eliminate false positives. 230
Eliminating or reducing false positives is a reasonable goal as long
as the result is not a shift in the relative proportions of false
positives to false negatives. 231 If a shift occurs, the result may be
a naked change in the applicable level of proof. Either the belief
that false positives are unacceptable, or that too many false positives
occurred under the McDonnell Douglas I Burdine system must
underlie the desired elimination of false positives. 232 The former
belief is misguided because false positives will occur under the
preponderance of the evidence standard. 233 The latter belief is also

227
See Matthew J. Freeman, Comment, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Abandonment
of Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Animus in Title VII Cases-Misinterpretation of McDonnell
Douglas and Its Progeny, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 267, 274-76 (1994). See also Culp, supra note 15,
at 246 (arguing that Hicks demonstrates the Supreme Court's desire to eliminate false
positives).
228
See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
229
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514-15 (1993) (Scalia, J., majority) (arguing that the dissent's
"falsity as discrimination" standard would force the fact finder to find discrimination where the
fact finder believed that none existed).
230
See id. at 513-14.
231
See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text (discussing the allocation of error through
assigning burdens of proof).
232
For commentary suggesting that the Court has gotten the mix offalse positives and false
negatives correct, see Cunniff, supra note 18, at 528-530.
233
That a risk of error exists means that error will occur. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text (discussing the allocation of risk in the civil justice system).
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misguided because the preponderance of the evidence standard
rather than the McDonnell Douglas test causes most, if not all, false
positives. 234 Nonetheless, exploring why the Hicks majority may
have felt that too many false positives existed under McDonnell
Douglas is important. Regardless of which reason underlies it, the
Hicks test heightens the level of certainty necessary for employees
to prevail in disparate treatment cases. 235
If too many false positives existed under the McDonnell
Douglas I Burdine test, either too many false positives existed relative
to false negatives or too many false positives existed relative to the
normally expected number of false positives. A misconception
regarding the expected ratio of false positives to false negatives may
explain a belief that false positives were much more numerous than
false negatives. Some may incorrectly suggest that the number of
false positives should roughly equal the number of false
negatives. 236 The preponderance of the evidence standard allocates
the quality of the error as between plaintiff and defendant rather
than the quantity of error. A discriminating employer is as likely to
be found not liable for discrimination as a non-discriminating
employer is to be found liable for discrimination. However, whether
the system produces the same number of non-discriminating, liable
employers as discriminating, nonliable employers depends on the
facts of the cases that are tried. 237 A particularly important factor
influencing the ratio of false positives to false negatives is the
number of discriminating and non-discriminating employers who go

234
See Brookins, supra note 19, at 126 (stating that "a clear and convincing standard is
indicated to avoid exposing employers to an unnecessarily high number of frivolous suits and
false positives.").
236
See supra notes 14-15 (discussing the change in the evidentiary and procedural standards
under Hicks).
236
See Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Finding and Efficiency: Toward an Economic
Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 160-62 (1987) (stating that
"requiring the juror to be at least 50% certain of fault before assigning liability might seem to
imply that the two kinds of errors-false positives and false negatives-will be equally likely
and hence cancel each other out," and discussing why such a perception is incorrect).
237
False negatives exist whenever an employer both discriminates and prevails at trial.
Few reasons exist to believe that possible false positive fact patterns actually predominate over
possible false negative fact patterns, save that discrimination occurs too infrequently to
generate as many false positive fact patterns as false negative fact patterns. However, as false
positive fact patterns require that unproffered reasons actually explain the job action, false
negative fact patterns should occur more frequently than false positive fact patterns. Of
course, even if false negatives occur more often than false positives, the preponderance of the
evidence system ought not be altered unless a systemic bias toward creating false negatives
exists.
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to trial and the type of evidence that may produce a false negative
or false positive. 238 An actual or anecdotal comparison of false
positives to false negatives cannot provide proof that the McDonnell
Douglas I Burdine system produced too many false positives. The assumption that Title VII over-indicates the prevalence of
discrimination extant in the American workplace likely underlies the
belief that the system created too many false positives. 239
An assumption that more false positives existed tha_n should have
been expected under the McDonnell Douglas I Burdine test is likewise
important. If the number of false positives can be decreased without
affecting the number of false negatives, little counsels against such
change. Reducing false positives without affecting false negatives is
theoretically possible. The preponderance of the evidence system
encompasses both false positives and false negatives because it
governs cases in which intentional discrimination occurred and cases
in which no intentional discrimination occurred. However, a
particular set of facts can only produce a false positive or a false
negative, since the employer either did or did not discriminate. If
false positives can be identified before a verdict is rendered, the
number of false positives can be reduced with minimal effect on the
level of proof.
Although false positives are easily defined, they are not easily
identified. In every false positive case that reaches the pretext step,
the employer must not have discriminated and its proffered reasons
must have been disbelieved. 240 If the employer discriminated, a
guilty verdict is a true positive even if the reasoning behind the
verdict is flawed. Although such a verdict might indicate a flawed
system, the flaw would not have created a false positive. Similarly,
the employer's proffered reasons must have been disbelieved, since
the belief that a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason caused the job

238
All false negatives are verdicts for employers. All false positives are verdicts for
employees. Whether fact patterns that produce verdicts for employees are as prevalent as fact
patterns that produce verdicts for employers is important.
239
Although this conclusion is not surprising, it suggests that the Hicks majority had little
reason for altering the system other than disagreement with the tenets underlying prior Court
decisions. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 506, 512-20 (1993) (Scalia, J., majority)
(disagreeing with the dissent's Burdine-based arguments).
240
For example, a false positive may occur if the employer fails to answer the employee's
prima facie case and a verdict is directed against the employer. Nothing short of eliminating
the post-prima facie presumption of discrimination would solve that false positive problem.
The Hicks majority did not advocate that alteration of the McDonnell Douglas test. See Hicks,
509 U.S. at 521 (explaining that the McDonnell Douglas test was a "procedural device,
designed only to establish an order of proof and production.").
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action necessarily yields a verdict for the employer. Thus, in a false
positive case, the fact finder must correctly disbelieve that the
proffered reasons caused the job action and correctly believe that an
unproffered nondiscriminatory reason was the actual cause.
Making certain that possible false positive cases are actual false
positives is the key to avoid heightening the level of proof. False
positives are erroneous verdicts. Erroneous verdicts given in the face
of evidence demanding contrary results are caused by blatant factfinder error or systemic error that forces the erroneous verdict. If
the fact finder is merely a poor fact finder, better voir dire may solve
the problem. If the system forces a fact finder to render a knowingly
incorrect verdict, a systemic correction is required. For a systemic
correction to fix false positives in the system, the verdict must be
knowingly incorrect.
The fact finder must be sure that
discrimination did not occur. Unless the court or the fact finder is
certain that the possible false positive is an actual false positive, it
risks trading possible false positives and possible true positives for
actual false negatives. If false negatives replace possible false
positives and possible true positives, the relative level of proof rises.
Cases in which a verdict for an employee was based on proof of
falsity are possible false positives. However, Hicks does not
guarantee that fact finders will not trade false positives for false
negatives. Without such a guarantee, the laudable goal of increasing
the system's accuracy is lost. Without an increase in accuracy, the
new system seems only to create artificial barriers to an employee's
success under Title VII.

V. GETTING IT RIGHT
The Court should create a mandatory inference of discrimination
requiring that an employee prevails on proof of falsity, 241 unless
the fact finder is sure, based on clear and convincing evidence, that
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason caused the job action. 242
241
See Calloway, supra note 58, at 1038 ("There is absolutely no reason why the Court could
not have defined the prima facie case and the operation of presumptions in disparate treatment
cases to provide that disproving the defendant's articulated nondiscriminatory reason, together
with proving a prima facie case, creates a presumption that discrimination has occurred.");
Gray, supra note 180, at 245 (noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 301 does not foreclose a
court from deciding that disproving an employer's proffered reasons requires judgment for an
employee).
242
This test recognizes that an unproffered explanation may explain the adverse job action.
However, it forces the fact finder to give a particular reason why the plaintiff did not meet its
burden of persuasion. See Szteinbok, supra note 89, at 1115 ("[P)laintiff in a disparate
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If the Court determines that the post-prima facie presumption
cannot be reborn in the form of a post-falsity inference, the Court
should create the post-falsity inference, but eliminate the post-prima
facie presumption. 243 Regardless of the existence of the post-prima
facie presumption, this solution eliminates false positives without
substantially increasing false negatives. Thus, those who believe
that false positives are too prevalent should be satisfied. Additionally, those who believe that proof of falsity is proof of intentional
discrimination should be satisfied because proof of falsity will yield
a verdict in an employee's favor, except when an employer has
clearly not discriminated. 244
A post-falsity mandatory inference of discrimination is reasonable
because proof of falsity and intentional discrimination are closely
related. Indeed, the evidence supporting the post-pretext inference
is stronger than that underlying the post-prima facie
presumption. 245 The post-falsity inference is a factual inference
flowing directly from the evidence, rather than a presumptive
inference that flows indirectly from the evidence. 246 The postfalsity presumption merely recognizes that if the fact finder
disbelieves the proffered reasons, intentional discrimination more
likely than not caused the firing.

treatment suit should prevail if her prima facie case is not successfully rebutted by a
substantiated, specific explanation that she has had a full and fair opportunity to challenge.");
see also Gray, supra note 181, at 234 n.156 (suggesting that an unproffered reason should be
supported by solid evidence to be a legitimate alternative explanation).
243
Federal Rule of Evidence 301 ostensibly destroys the presumption and may bar its
revival. Rule 301 bars shifting the burden of persuasion to the party against whom the
presumption acts. See FED. R. Evm. 301; see also supra note 76 and accompanying text
(discussing how Federal Rule of Evidence 301 controls the presumption created when a
plaintiff presents a prima facie case).
244
This result may resemble the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins mixed-motives model. 490
U.S. 228 (1989). Under the mixed-motives model, once an employee proves that bias affected
the employer's decisionmaking process, the burden of production shifts to the employer to prove
that the same decision would have been reached in the absence of discrimination. See id. at
244-47. The proposed solution mimics the mixed-motives model in that the fact finder may
find for the employer after proof that discrimination likely caused the job action. Under the
suggested solution, proof of falsity is proof of discrimination.
2
~ See Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Resort to a
pretextual explanation is, like flight from the scene of a crime, evidence indicating consciousness of guilt, which is ... evidence of illegal conduct.").
2Ml That the inference flows directly from the evidence does not mean that direct evidence
of discrimination exists. Direct evidence is unnecessary for an employee to prevail. See St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
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Faced with both a prima facie case and proof of falsity, a
reasonable fact finder cannot conclude that intentional
discrimination did not likely occur, unless strong evidence to the
contrary exists. 247 Once falsity is proven, a mandatory inference
of discrimination is warranted because discrimination was the
relevant issue during the falsity inquiry. That the McDonnell
Douglas inquiry tested all proffered reasons other than
discrimination and determined that all of those reasons were false
means that discrimination has been proven by a preponderance of
the evidence. 248
For example, if an employer were sued for firing an employee due
to the employee's political beliefs and all other reasons that the
employer gave for the firing were discredited, a mandatory inference
that the employee's political beliefs caused the firing would be
reasonable. Facing liability for firing an employee based on political
beliefs, an employer would likely present its best reasons for the job
action. The fact that the employer's best reasons are not credible
suggests that the employee's political beliefs caused the firing. An
inference would be improper only when the inferred cause of the
firing is so improbable that an unknown and unproffered reason
more likely caused the firing than the inferred reason. If the current
Supreme Court believes that after proof of falsity, an unknown,
unproffered reason is a more likely cause of the subject job action
than discrimination, the entire McDonnell Douglas test should be
dismantled. 249
The McDonnell Douglas test steadily eliminates reasons other than
discrimination for the job action. 250 At the time McDonnell

247

If a plaintiff discredits all of a defendant's evidence, evidence that previously supported
a mandatory presumption of the presumed fact remains. The inference of discrimination is not
destroyed by an employer's articulation of proffered reasons. Consequently, even if the
inference of discrimination is not mandated, a fact finder should infer intentional
discrimination, unless the fact finder believes that the prima facie case does not create even
an inference of discrimination.
248
Arguably, this is how prosecutors remove and prove reasonable doubt. Of course, this
method was specifically sanctioned in Burdine. 450 U.S. at 252·58; see also supra notes 102-04
and accompanying text (discussing how the burden of production and the mandatory
presumption aid in the search for the truth by narrowing the fact finder's field of inquiry).;
Szteinbok, supra note 89, at 1121-22 (arguing that eliminating asserted reasons for adverse
job action is legitimate form of indirect proof sanctioned by McDonnell Douglas and Burdine).
249
One such commentator has called for the complete dismantling of the McDonnell Douglas
structure. See Davis, supra note 162 at 709.
250
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also supra notes 28-39
and accompanying text (discussing how the McDonnell Douglas test functions generally). The
prima facie case eliminates some explanations for the job action. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253·
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Douglas was decided, the prevailing belief was that discrimination
was the most likely cause of a job action when no explanation to the
contrary existed. 251 That sentiment may no longer hold in the
Supreme Court or portions of the general public. 252 If this assumption is untrue, retaining the McDonnell Douglas test makes
little sense unless the test increases the accuracy of the fact-finding
process. 253 Hicks suggests that the post-prima facie presumption
is nothing more than a tool to advance the McDonnell Douglas test,
rather than a substantive reflection of the truth in the American
workplace. 254 This view allows the Hicks majority to retain the
prima facie presumption, forestall any outrage that might attend
elimination of the presumption from those who believe
discrimination remains a substantial problem, and yet eviscerate the
McDonnell Douglas test by eliminating proof of falsity as a proxy for
intentional discrimination.
Requiring the fact finder to be convinced that a particular
unproffered reason caused the job action ensures that possible false
positives are actual false positives that become true negatives, rather
than true positives that become false negatives. The fact finder must

54 ("The prima facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection.") (citing International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977)). An employer's defense eliminates
consideration of other reasons, except those presented at trial. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521
(stating that the McDonnell Douglas mandatory presumption exists to encourage employers
to present legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for a job action by establishing "an order of
proof and production"). The pretext inquiry eliminates all remaining causes of the job action.
See id. at 255 n.10.
251
See Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), affd, 411 U.S. 792
(1973) (discussing the plaintiffs lack of access to information that could have aided in proving
discrimination, and generally stating that employers' reasons for adverse job actions were often
a pretext for discrimination). That idea also prevailed when Furnco was decided. See Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978) ("A McDonnell Douglas prima facie
showing is ... simply proof of actions taken by the employer from which we infer
discriminatory animus because experience has proved that in the absence of any other
explanation it is more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on impermissible considerations.").
252
See Calloway, supra note 58, at 998 ("With its decision in Saint Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, the Court joined academics, judges, and a growing segment of the American population
that has come to believe that discrimination no longer exists.") (citation omitted).
253
An irrational assumption of discrimination could aid the fact-finding process if the
irrationality forces the employer to investigate the cause of the job action more thoroughly in
order to avoid the effect of the irrational assumption. More vigorous investigation should lead
to correctly identifying the cause of the job action more frequently. See supra notes 28-39 and
accompanying text (discussing the history and accuracy of the McDonnell Douglas test).
254
See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510 (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework becomes
irrelevant once the employer's burden of production is met).
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find that such reason actually caused the firing, not merely that it
might have caused the firing. 255 Thus, the only cases affected
would be those in which the fact finder was sure that discrimination
had not occurred. 256
Two concerns may attend this approach: 1) that placing any
burden on an employer is improper; and 2) that the fact finder must
be convinced by clear and convincing evidence that discrimination
did not occur. Under Rule 301, an employer cannot bear the burden
of proving its proffered reasons. 257 However, the proposed plan
does not require an employer to prove the proffered reason.
Discrimination has already been proven by the time the putative
burden is placed on an employer. Any burden that exists is akin to
the burden that every defendant feels to prove a defense, even when
not required to do so. 258 An alternative would be to create the
post-falsity inference and eliminate the fact finder's opportunity to
conclude that no discrimination occurred. Given that an employer
denies the legitimacy, or ignores the existence of the unproffered
reason, the employer has no reasonable basis to complain because
the unproffered reason may help it prevail. The unproffered reason
usually should be rejected as a possible cause of the job action.
The clear and convincing standard is proper because the fact finder
should be sure that discriininatio~ did not occur. 259 The unprof256
Proof of a prima facie case, coupled with proof of falsity, should obligate employer to do
more than merely articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. See Belton, supra note
24, at 1266-71; see generally Furnish, supra note 109 (discussing the differing burdens of proof
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
in individual disparate treatment actions).
256
Situations in which a minority employee is fired for no reason can be distinguished from
those where a minority is fired because of intentional discrimination, although the distinction
may not be very large. Arguably, discrimination is a factor in both situations, its existence is
merely more pronounced in the latter situation. See Sullivan, supra note 89, at 1162 (asserting
that possibly all disparate treatment cases are mixed-motives cases).
257
FED. R. EVID. 301; see also supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (comparing the
presumption to a "bursting bubble," and stating that the presumption is fragile, and fails upon
a showing that the presumed facts are untrue).
258
See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 163, at 618 ("An inference ... is a conclusion that
logically can be drawn from the evidence. If the evidence causes the fact finder to infer and
thus believe the conclusion, the opposing party will then have to prove a defense.").
259
The clear and convincing standard is reasonable in this setting, even though it was
rejected in Price Waterhouse. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989)
(stating that under the circumstances of this case, the appropriate evidentiary standard is a
preponderance of the evidence standard). The focus here. is to guarantee that the
preponderance of the evidence standard regarding intentional discrimination is not heightened.
The only way to do that is to force the fact finder to be certain that its decision that no
discrimination occurred is correct, given that strong evidence in suggesting the existence of
discrimination exists. Imposing a preponderance of the evidence standard regarding the truth
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fered reason will usually be unchallenged by an employee and will
be considered a plausible alternative to discrimination based on the
fact finder's personal background. Because an employee has no
reasonable opportunity to challenge the unproffered reason, the
burden of proof should be higher than the preponderance of the
evidence, if only to counter the employee's inability to produce
evidence to rebut an unproffered reason. If an unproffered reason
will eliminate an employee's recovery, the fact finder ought to be
convinced that the reason actually caused the job action~ An
employer need only proffer the reason to eliminate the burden of
proof regarding the unproffered reason. 260
VI.

CONCLUSION

The new disparate treatment paradigm may be a manifestation of
the claim that rules change whenever they help minorities prevail
too much. 261 Conversely, the new paradigm may be just a misguided attempt to reduce error in the system. Unfortunately, the
Hicks-influenced McDonnell Douglas test harms plaintiff employees
by reallocating the error it was intended to eliminate. Since the new
paradigm fails to reach its goal, it is hoped that the Supreme Court
will consider this Article's proposed solution and alter the system
once more, so that employees arid employers may be treated fairly
and the justice system can get it right in the disparate treatment
field.

of the unproffered reason would not destroy the efficacy of the proposed test; it would merely
lessen its effect.
260
Whether an employer has proffered a reason may seem difficult to discern. It is not. The
Hicks majority easily identified the employer's proffered reasons. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507
(Scalia, J., majority); see also id. at 530 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting) (reminding the majority how
easily the proffered reasons were identified in this case).
261
Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive
Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495, 539 (1990) ("[W]hen conventional legal rules work too
effectively to promote the civil rights of blacks, the rules change; society through its
legislatures and courts applies the rules differently or invents a new exception and says it was
there all along.") (citation omitted).

